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1855 
WHEN WILL ASYLUM LAW PROTECT 
WOMEN?: THE ABUSIVE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN AGENCY DECISION MAKING 
AND ASYLUM CLAIMS INVOLVING 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
Abstract: Over the past several decades, applications for asylum by women who 
claim membership in a particular social group related to domestic violence have 
been largely unsuccessful. Attitudes regarding violence against women, the asy-
lum requirements, and the failure to explicitly include gender as a protected 
group under both domestic and international law contribute to the difficulty that 
women face in asserting these claims. In addition, the volatile nature of agency 
decision making, bolstered by the broad deference afforded to agencies by feder-
al courts under Chevron and Brand X, make outcomes inconsistent and unpre-
dictable. During the summer of 2018, Attorney General Jeff Sessions issued an 
opinion in Matter of A-B- that appeared to heighten the asylum requirements fur-
ther, not only for women with domestic violence-related claims, but for all 
asylees who claim persecution by non-state actors. The decision received criti-
cism from immigration advocates, as it did not adhere to past asylum require-
ments from the Board of Immigration Appeals. Subsequently, federal courts will 
have to determine whether to defer to this heightened standard in the future. The 
far-reaching implications of the decision—as well as the power the Attorney 
General claimed in issuing it—should spur courts to take a second look at their 
Chevron jurisprudence. In order to maintain the well-established standard for 
persecution by non-state actors in asylum claims, the Supreme Court must re-
examine, clarify, and limit the applicability of Chevron and Brand X. 
INTRODUCTION 
This year, Rosa, a Honduran woman, will flee to the United States after 
suffering years of emotional, mental, and physical abuse at the hands of her 
husband, whom she married when she was just sixteen.1 Rosa will have to 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Asylum Decisions and Denials Jump in 2018, TRAC IMMIGR. (Nov. 29, 2018), http://trac.
syr.edu/immigration/reports/539 [https://perma.cc/YH4Z-9YWS] (tracking the asylum decisions and 
denials in 2018). The incidence of intimate partner violence and femicide is extremely high in the 
geographic area known as the “Northern Triangle,” which encompasses El Salvador, Honduras, and 
Guatemala. CHILDREN’S DEFENSE FUND—NEW YORK, DOMESTIC AND GANG VIOLENCE VICTIMS 
BECOME INELIGIBLE FOR ASYLUM 2 (Aug. 2018), https://www.childrensdefense.org/cdfny/wp-
content/uploads/sites/3/2018/08/Domestic-Gang-Violence-Report-with-GRAPHIC.pdf [https://perma.
cc/RBA5-ZRNZ]. Statistics show that half of women from these countries experience intimate partner 
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make a long and often dangerous journey from her home country through Gua-
temala and Mexico to get to the United States.2 In order to seek asylum, Rosa 
must be physically present in the United States or seeking entrance into the 
United States at a port of entry.3 Next, she will have to pass a “credible fear 
interview” with an asylum officer.4 Rosa will be asked to describe the specifics 
of the abuse she endured and what, if anything, prevented her from escaping or 
relocating in her home country.5 The interview will last several hours; Rosa 
may have difficulty with the technical nature of the questions or may struggle 
to understand the importance of it for her claim.6 To move forward in the pro-
cess, Rosa will have to convince the interviewer that she has a credible fear of 
returning to her country.7 
If Rosa passes the credible fear interview, the next obstacle is developing 
a legal argument to convince an immigration judge that she satisfies the asy-
lum claim requirements.8 For Rosa, like many asylum seekers, this will be in-
credibly difficult, because noncitizens are not provided an attorney—even in 
adversarial proceedings before an immigration judge that may result in a final 
deportation order.9 It is extremely difficult for noncitizens representing them-
                                                                                                                           
violence of some kind and fourteen of the twenty-five countries with the highest rates of femicide are 
located in Latin America. Id. 
 2 See Dara Lind, The Migrant Caravan, Explained, VOX (Oct. 25, 2018), https://www.vox.com/
2018/10/24/18010340/caravan-trump-border-honduras-mexico [https://perma.cc/VJ83-7URE] (de-
scribing the conditions that migrants deal with during their journey from their home country to the 
United States). 
 3 The Affirmative Asylum Process, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. (Apr. 19, 2019), https://
www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-and-asylum/asylum/affirmative-asylum-process [https://perma.
cc/4HBG-LWN8]. If migrants appear at an official port of entry, they are entitled to make an asylum 
claim and undergo a credible fear interview to determine if their claim can go forward. Lind, supra 
note 2. 
 4 Questions & Answers: Credible Fear Screening, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. (July 15, 
2015) [hereinafter USCIS Q & A], https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/
questions-answers-credible-fear-screening [https://perma.cc/XQ8N-6XSL]. 
 5 CONCHITA CRUZ ET AL., URBAN JUSTICE CTR., VINDICATING THE RIGHTS OF ASYLUM SEEKERS 
AT THE BORDER AND BEYOND: A GUIDE TO REPRESENTING ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED REMOV-
AL AND REINSTATEMENT OF REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS 28 (June 2018), https://asylumadvocacy.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/06/ASAP-Expedited-Removal-Guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/8DSV-BHUJ]. 
 6 Id. at 30. 
 7 Id.; USCIS Q & A, supra note 4. The credible fear interview is conducted by an asylum officer 
employed by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). USCIS Q & A, supra note 4. The inter-
view consists of a series of questions, at the conclusion of which the asylum officer will refer the case 
for further proceedings if it is determined that the applicant has a credible fear of persecution or tor-
ture. Id. DHS defines “credible fear of persecution” as a “significant possibility” that the applicant 
was persecuted or has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group (PSG), or political opinion if returned to his or her home 
country. Id. “Credible fear of torture” is defined as a “significant possibility” that the applicant would 
be subjected to torture if returned to his or her home country. Id. 
 8 See CRUZ ET AL., supra note 5, at 36. 
 9 See Gretchen Frazee, What Constitutional Rights Do Undocumented Immigrants Have?, PBS 
NEWSHOUR (June 25, 2018), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/what-constitutional-rights-do-
2020] Agency Decision Making and Asylum Claims Involving Domestic Violence 1857 
selves pro se to conduct the legal research and gather the evidence necessary to 
assert a successful claim.10 Based on data from deportation cases decided be-
tween 2007 and 2012, only 37% of all immigrants with removal cases secured 
representation.11 The impact is clear: among those immigrants who were de-
tained and obtained counsel, 49% had successful outcomes, while only 23% of 
detained immigrants who were not represented received the relief for which 
they applied.12 
Further, in order for Rosa to successfully assert her claim, she must show 
that she faced persecution in her home country on account of her race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group (PSG), or political affilia-
tion.13 Although Rosa is far from the first woman fleeing domestic violence to 
                                                                                                                           
undocumented-immigrants-have [https://perma.cc/4REK-HHY9] (explaining that, because immigra-
tion proceedings are civil rather than criminal, the constitutional right to counsel does not apply to 
undocumented people). The statute provides that an individual in removal proceedings may be repre-
sented by counsel should she so choose; however, it specifically states that such representation shall 
be at no cost to the government. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA), Pub L. No. 414, 
§ 292, 66 Stat. 163, 235 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2018)). The only exception is for 
mentally disabled immigrants in removal proceedings where the appointment of counsel is required as 
a “reasonable accommodation.” Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, No. CV 10–02211 DMG, 2013 WL 
3674492, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2013). 
 10 BRYAN LONEGAN, LEGAL AID SOC’Y, IMMIGRATION DETENTION AND REMOVAL: A GUIDE 
FOR DETAINEES AND THEIR FAMILIES 1 (Feb. 2006), https://www.nilc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/
12/detentionremovalguide_2006-02.pdf [https://perma.cc/M7TM-CLZP]. Types of evidence that may 
be appropriate to present at a deportation hearing include letters of support from relatives, letters from 
employers or pay stubs, attendance in rehabilitation programs, school records, and other pieces of 
evidence that support the respondent’s testimony or corroborate their claims. Id. at 18–19. 
 11 INGRID EAGLY & STEVEN SHAFER, AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, ACCESS TO COUNSEL IN 
IMMIGRATION COURT 2 (Sept. 2016), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/
files/research/access_to_counsel_in_immigration_court.pdf [https://perma.cc/KQM4-P37N]. Detained 
immigrants are much less likely to obtain counsel than non-detained immigrants—only 14% of de-
tained immigrants are represented, while two-thirds of non-detained immigrants are represented. Id. 
 12 Id. at 3. Barriers that immigrants face in obtaining representation include difficulty finding and 
retaining the services of an attorney while in detention, the inconvenient location of detention facili-
ties, and inability to pay. Id. at 6. Not only are noncitizens more likely to win their cases when they 
have representation, they are also more likely to be released from detention (44% of represented peo-
ple are released compared with 11% who are without representation) and to apply for relief in the first 
place (32% of detained noncitizens who are represented apply for relief compared with only 3% who 
are without representation). Id. at 2. 
 13 Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, §§ 201, 208, 94 Stat. 102, 105 (codified as amended 
at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)). Persecution on account of membership in a PSG as valid grounds for asy-
lum in the United States is drawn from the definition of refugee in Article 1 of the United Nations 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (the Convention), which was approved in 1951. Con-
vention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 1(A), July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6577, 189 U.N.T.S. 
150, 152; see also Nicholas R. Bednar, Social Group Semantics: The Evidentiary Requirements of 
Particularity and Social Distinction in Pro Se Asylum Adjudication, 100 MINN. L. REV. 355, 359–60 
(2015) (explaining that the United States drew the definition of refugee from the Convention). The 
Convention expands upon Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which was ap-
proved by the United Nations in 1948. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
at art. 14 (Dec. 10, 1948); Vic Ullom, Voluntary Repatriation of Refugees and Customary Interna-
tional Law, 29 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 115, 119 (2001). The Declaration established the right of 
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seek asylum in the United States, her chance for success is incredibly uncer-
tain, because the PSG requirements remain volatile and are the subject of in-
tense debate between immigration prosecutors, advocates, and adjudicators.14 
Evolution in case law over the past thirty-five years has drastically 
changed how Rosa must argue her asylum case.15 In 1985, the Board of Immi-
gration Appeals (BIA) defined a PSG as a “group of persons all of whom share 
a common, immutable characteristic,” and that remained the consensus defini-
tion for decades.16 But in the late 2000s, in response to increased gang activity 
in Latin America that led to a dramatic rise in asylum claims from refugees and 
internally displaced persons escaping the violence, the BIA chose to narrow 
the definition.17 Subsequently, the BIA added the additional requirements of 
“particularity” and “social distinction” to the definition.18 The requirements 
were addressed again during the summer of 2018, when Attorney General 
(AG) Jeff Sessions issued an opinion in Matter of A-B-.19 A-B- overturned 
                                                                                                                           
persons to apply for asylum in a member nation if they experienced persecution in their home country. 
Ullom, supra, at 119. 
 14 Liliya Paraketsova, Note, Why Guidance from the Supreme Court Is Required in Redefining the 
Particular Social Group Definition in Refugee Law, 51 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 437, 460 (2017) (de-
scribing how the inconsistent PSG caselaw leads to continued uncertainty). For two decades, the 
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) case Matter of Acosta instructed courts on the requirements for a 
cognizable PSG claim. Id.; see 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985). Yet, once the BIA began to 
revise the PSG definition in an attempt to clarify the test, the opposite resulted. Paraketsova, supra, at 
460. Some federal circuit courts chose to adopt the updated definition based on Chevron doctrine, 
while others refused to apply it. Id. 
 15 See Johanna K. Bachmair, Note, Asylum at Last?: Matter of A-R-C-G-’s Impact on Domestic 
Violence Victims Seeking Asylum, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 1053, 1060–63 (2016) (outlining the changes 
in the definition of PSG, including the addition of the social distinction and particularity require-
ments). 
 16 See Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233 (finding that, based on the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and case precedent, the definition of PSG for the purposes of 
asylum is a group that shares common, immutable characteristics); Paraketsova, supra note 14, at 
449–50 (describing the wide acceptance of the Matter of Acosta definition of PSG). With the excep-
tion of the Second Circuit, all federal circuit courts found the agency construction of particular social 
group under Matter of Acosta to be permissible after analyzing it based on Chevron doctrine. Rachel 
Gonzalez Settlage, Rejecting the Children of Violence: Why U.S. Asylum Law Should Return to the 
Acosta Definition of “Particular Social Group,” 30 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 287, 298 (2016). 
 17 Settlage, supra note 16, at 312. 
 18 See Matter of E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 591, 594 (B.I.A. 2008) (establishing the additional re-
quirement of social visibility to the definition of PSG); Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 582–83 
(B.I.A. 2008) (establishing the additional requirement of particularity to the definition of PSG). After 
much criticism of the additional requirements of particularity and social distinction (or “social visibil-
ity”) from federal circuit courts, immigration advocates, and the UNHCR, the BIA attempted to clari-
fy these requirements. Settlage, supra note 16, at 305–06; see infra notes 147–157 and accompanying 
text. 
 19 See Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 247, 317 (A.G. 2018) (overturning Matter of A-R-C-G-); 
Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 392–95 (B.I.A. 2014) (determining that “married women in 
Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship” satisfied all of the requirements of a cognizable 
PSG). Attorney General (AG) Jefferson Sessions became aware of the A-B- proceeding after the BIA 
reversed and remanded the case to the immigration judge who first heard it. NAT’L IMMIGRATION 
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Matter of A-R-C-G-, a previous case that held that “married women . . . who 
are unable to leave their relationship” was a permissible PSG for asylum.20 The 
case was overturned because, in the AG’s view, the BIA did not accurately ap-
ply the social distinction and particularity requirements.21 The decision also 
called into question whether persecution by non-state actors could ever be 
grounds for asylum.22 After A-B-, immigration advocates were left wondering 
how to argue cases for women like Rosa who claim asylum based on persecu-
tion in the form of domestic violence.23 
The requirements for asylum are volatile and subject to changing political 
winds and country conditions that influence immigration trends.24 In recent 
times, this is especially true for claims that involve private actor violence gen-
erally and claims by women based on domestic violence specifically.25 This 
volatility can be attributed to changing views held by political administrations 
regarding asylum requirements, the well-entrenched policy of deference to 
agency decisions, and the refusal of some federal circuit courts to adopt the 
                                                                                                                           
JUSTICE CTR., ASYLUM PRACTICE ADVISORY: APPLYING FOR ASYLUM AFTER MATTER OF A-B- 7 (Jan. 
2019), https://www.immigrantjustice.org/media/173/download [https://perma.cc/EL7Q-XV5P]. The BIA 
granted asylum to the respondent and found that the claim was similar to that of A-R-C-G- and thus 
needed to be reconsidered. Id. After the case was remanded back to the immigration judge, AG Ses-
sions instead referred the case to himself. Id. 
 20 See generally A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388. Although A-R-C-G- was a victory for advocates 
who sought recognition that survivors of domestic violence are eligible for asylum, critics consider the 
PSG analysis inconsistent and difficult to reconcile with prior BIA case law. NAT’L IMMIGRATION 
JUSTICE CTR., supra note 19, at 5. 
 21 Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 319. AG Sessions also noted that the particular social group 
involved in Matter of A-R-C-G- involved so-called “private criminal activity” rather than violence 
perpetuated by the government of the applicant’s home country and stated that, generally, claims will 
be unsuccessful when brought by noncitizens who are victims of domestic violence or gang violence. 
Id. at 320. 
 22 See id. at 319, 335 (holding that social groups defined by their susceptibility to criminal activi-
ty conducted by non-state actors are unlikely to meet the requirements of a cognizable asylum claim 
because they encompass large parts of society and thus lack particularity). AG Sessions mentions that 
there may be some circumstance wherein private criminal activity could be the basis of a cognizable 
claim, but does not give any guidance as to what that claim might look like. Id. at 317. 
 23 See id. at 317 (overruling Matter of A-R-C-G- and noting that victims of private violence will 
rarely meet the requirements of asylum). 
 24 See, e.g., Lind, supra note 2. Increased immigration over the past decade is largely the result of 
bloodshed and turbulence in the Northern Triangle, which comprises Guatemala, Honduras, and El 
Salvador. Id.; see Daniel J. Steinbock, Refugee and Resistance: Casablanca’s Lessons for Refugee 
Law, 7 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 649, 674 (1993) (describing the tendency of refugee policy to shift accord-
ing to political changes and pressures). 
 25 See Katie Benner & Caitlin Dickerson, Sessions Says Domestic and Gang Violence Are Not 
Grounds for Asylum, N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/11/us/politics/
sessions-domestic-violence-asylum.html [https://perma.cc/JLY8-PSBT] (noting that attorneys general 
have gone back and forth regarding their view on how to treat asylum claims involving domestic vio-
lence for the last three decades, beginning with Janet Reno). 
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interpretation offered by agency decisionmakers.26 Through an examination of 
agency decision making and deference to agencies in federal courts, first estab-
lished in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., this 
Note focuses on the process by which the asylum requirements were altered 
over time.27 Part I discusses the Chevron doctrine, focusing on the leading cas-
es and their impact on immigration law, as well as the factors that courts con-
sider when they determine whether agency actions are legitimate.28 Part II 
traces the development of the domestic violence asylum claim of persecution 
based on membership in a PSG, responses to such claims, and the impact of 
the AG’s decision in Matter of A-B-.29 Part III argues that the AG’s interpreta-
tion of the law in Matter of A-B- was unreasonable and thus cannot be justified 
under Chevron and its progeny; it also argues that the Chevron doctrine should 
be reconsidered in light of decisions like Matter of A-B-.30 
I. COURTS ANSWERING TO AGENCIES: CHEVRON, ITS SUCCESSORS,  
AND THEIR IMPACT ON IMMIGRATION POLICY 
In 1984, in Chevron, the Supreme Court laid the foundation for determin-
ing whether and when a court affords deference to agency decisions.31 Thereaf-
ter, the Court has taken divergent stances in interpreting Chevron.32 United 
States v. Mead Corp. envisioned a more robust role for federal courts in deter-
mining whether an agency is owed Chevron deference at all.33 National Cable 
                                                                                                                           
 26 Nitzan Sternberg, Note, Do I Need to Pin a Target to My Back?: The Definition of “Particular 
Social Group” in U.S. Asylum Law, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 245, 249–50, 274, 280 (2011); see Benner 
& Dickerson, supra note 25 (indicating that different attorneys general have approached domestic 
violence-based asylum claims differently). The First, Second, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, Tenth, and Elev-
enth Circuits give deference to the BIA interpretation of particular social group. Id. at 270–72. The 
Third and Seventh Circuits reject the current BIA approach and maintain the approach established in 
Matter of Acosta. Id. at 274–75. The Ninth Circuit applies its own definition of particular social group 
in cases where the BIA has not considered a similar group, and defers in cases where it has. Id. at 276. 
 27 See 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 28 See infra notes 31–102 and accompanying text. 
 29 See infra notes 103–207 and accompanying text. 
 30 See infra notes 208–269 and accompanying text. 
 31 See 467 U.S. at 866 (determining that an Environmental Protection Agency regulation allowing 
for the treatment of all pollution-producing devices within the same industry equally was a permissible 
interpretation of the Clean Air Act). In coming to its conclusion, the Court looked at both the legislative 
history and the statutory language interpreted by the agency. Id. at 859–64. The Court also discussed the 
tension between the policy choices advocated for by each of the parties and determined that the “wis-
dom of the agency’s policy” is not a legitimate justification when challenging an agency’s interpreta-
tion of an ambiguous statutory provision. Id. at 865–66. 
 32 Jack M. Beermann, Chevron at the Roberts Court: Still Failing After All These Years, 83 
FORDHAM L. REV. 731, 740 (2014) (describing an ideological divide on the Supreme Court with re-
gard to views on agency regulation). 
 33 See 533 U.S. 218, 234 (2001) (holding that a United States Customs tariff classification ruling 
was not entitled to Chevron deference because treating the rulings as having the force of law was not 
justified by the statute); see also Eric R. Womack, Into the Third Era of Administrative Law: An Em-
2020] Agency Decision Making and Asylum Claims Involving Domestic Violence 1861 
& Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services, decided five years 
after Mead, instructs courts to defer in the majority of cases.34 Section A of this 
Part explores the leading cases and policies that shape the Chevron doctrine as 
it is implemented today.35 Section B discusses the overlap between arbitrary 
and capricious review under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and 
Chevron Step Two.36 Section C looks at how the Chevron doctrine applies in 
the immigration context.37 
A. Who Says What the Law Is? Agency Decision Making and Chevron 
Even prior to the ratification of the Constitution, the Founders acknowl-
edged the inevitability of statutory ambiguities and knew they would require 
resolution.38 Throughout U.S. history, views on the role of agency decision 
making, and how much leeway agencies should have to interpret their own 
organic statutes, have fluctuated in response to current events and the political 
climate.39 In the post-New Deal era, the dominant thinking was that agencies 
were in the best position to address the nation’s problems without interference 
by robust judicial review.40 It was in this context that Congress passed the APA 
                                                                                                                           
pirical Study of the Supreme Court’s Retreat from Chevron Principles in United States v. Mead, 107 
DICK. L. REV. 289, 291 (2002) (analyzing the limiting impact of Mead on the Chevron framework). 
 34 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005) (determining that Chevron applied and that the Federal Communica-
tion Commission’s interpretation of the Communications Act was permissible even though it conflict-
ed with Ninth Circuit precedent). 
 35 See infra notes 38–69 and accompanying text. 
 36 See infra notes 78–88 and accompanying text. 
 37 See infra notes 89–102 and accompanying text. 
 38 Terrence J. McCarrick, Jr., In Defense of a Little Judiciary: A Textual and Constitutional 
Foundation for Chevron, 55 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 55, 67 (2018). For example, in Federalist No. 37, 
James Madison acknowledged that imprecision was inevitable despite his belief that new laws were 
written by those who paid special attention to technicalities. Id.; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 
182–83 (James Madison) (Yale Univ. Press ed., 2009). In Edwards’ Lessee v. Darby, the Supreme 
Court first acknowledged that where an ambiguous law exists, those who were appointed to enforce 
its provisions are entitled to respect. McCarrick, supra, at 67; see also 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 206, 210 
(1827). 
 39 GARY LAWSON & PHILIP S. BECK, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 72 (7th ed. 2016). 
 40 See generally Charles H. Koch, Jr., James Landis: The Administrative Process, 48 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 419, 425–28 (1996) (outlining preeminent administrative law scholar James Landis’s strong 
belief in the advantages of the administrative state over the judicial process). Landis’s background in 
administrative law included experience helping to found the Securities and Exchange Commission. Id. 
at 419. He envisioned a robust administrative state as the most efficient, cost-effective way to run a 
government. Id. Landis emphasized the comparative advantage of a robust administrative process in 
terms of flexibility, technical and specialized knowledge, and participation. Id. at 425. Landis seemed 
to disregard concerns about the dangers of agency capture by the industries that they were tasked to 
regulate, instead conceiving the relationship between agency and industry as one of sensitivity and 
responsiveness to evolving problems. Id. at 427–28. Although Landis did see judicial review as the 
final check on agency decision making, he criticized the tendency to be wary of agencies and did not 
support the imposition of judicial limitations on the options available to agencies in fulfilling their 
mandate. Id. at 428–29. 
1862 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:1855 
in 1946.41 The APA provides that, when reviewing questions of law or inter-
preting statutory provisions, courts should set aside any agency action deter-
mined to be unlawful or illegitimate for a number of reasons.42 Despite the 
plain language of the APA indicating that interpreting statutes should be within 
the purview of the courts, the Supreme Court dictated another path.43 The 
Court presumed that where Congress intentionally or accidentally left a statu-
tory gap, it intended for the administering agency to resolve or fill the gap by 
providing an interpretation of ambiguous language.44 
In 1984, in Chevron, the Court provided guidance to courts on how to re-
view decisions made by agencies interpreting their organic statutes.45 The case 
created a two-step test that courts follow when determining whether an agen-
cy’s interpretation is sound.46 At Step One, a court must look at whether the 
statute passed by Congress speaks on the issue being considered.47 If the stat-
ute is clear and unambiguous on the issue, a court simply looks at whether the 
agency action accords with that directive.48 But if there is a statutory ambiguity 
with various possible interpretations, the court must continue to Step Two to 
determine whether the policy implemented by the agency is a reasonable inter-
pretation of the statute.49 Since Chevron’s adoption, very few cases fail at Step 
Two.50 Where courts do conduct a robust analysis at Step Two, they generally 
                                                                                                                           
 41 See Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (APA), Pub. L. No. 89-554, § 706, 80 Stat. 378, 393 
(1966) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2018)) (describing the scope of review that courts are 
allowed when faced with litigation involving agency decision making or policy).  
 42 Id. § 706(1)(A). 
 43 Bernard W. Bell, The Model APA and the Scope of Judicial Review: Importing Chevron into 
State Administrative Law, 20 WIDENER L.J. 801, 803 (2011). Before Congress passed the APA, the 
Supreme Court established its role in interpreting statutes, although it acknowledged that agency in-
terpretations may merit consideration. Id. at 802–03. Furthermore, in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., the 
Court found that courts remain the ultimate arbiters where more than one reasonable interpretation of 
statutory language is possible, though agency interpretations could be considered and given some 
weight. 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1994). 
 44 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865–66. 
 45 Id. at 842–44. 
 46 Id. at 842–43. 
 47 Robin Kundis Craig, Agencies Interpreting Courts Interpreting Statutes: The Deference Co-
nundrum of a Divided Supreme Court, 61 EMORY L.J. 1, 12 (2011). 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 See Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron Step Two’s Domain, 93 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1441, 1444 (2018) (describing the lack of development of guidelines for Step Two because few 
cases fail at Step Two); Craig, supra note 47, at 12–13 (describing the limited nature of a court’s re-
view at Step Two). Challenges based upon the wisdom of an agency’s policy choice will rarely be 
successful at Chevron Step Two because the court is not instructed to consider whether it agrees that 
the agency interpretation is superior to other possible interpretations. Craig, supra note 47, at 12–13. 
Instead, the court looks at whether the interpretation falls within the spectrum of reasonable choices 
based upon the relevant statute. Id. 
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use one of three possible approaches.51 The Court has used all three of these 
approaches but has provided no definitive determination as to the correct 
method at Step Two.52 Although Chevron appeared to create a simple frame-
work to determine when and how to afford agencies deference, in practice, the 
guidance from the Court is unclear and inconsistently applied.53 
In the decade following Chevron, the Court did not make any attempt to 
simplify its purview, despite calls by administrative lawyers for clarity.54 Alt-
hough courts deferred to agencies more frequently after Chevron, there was a 
sense that courts sometimes applied deference without engaging in the Chev-
ron analysis.55 In response, Justice Stevens, who intended Chevron to provide 
a role for judicial oversight, and Justice Scalia, who believed that the decision 
permitted a wide berth for agencies, led the majorities and dissents in a number 
of cases that complicated the Chevron doctrine.56 
                                                                                                                           
 51 Barnett & Walker, supra note 50, at 1448, 1451. One approach is akin to arbitrary and capricious 
review under the APA, wherein the reviewing court looks to see if the interpretation is adequately justi-
fied by the agency and whether the agency considered several factors in charting its course. Id. at 1454. 
A second approach focuses primarily on the structure and text of the statute to determine whether the 
interpretation is reasonable. Id. at 1451. The third approach focuses on the purpose of the statute as a 
whole and inquires whether the agency interpretation is consistent with that purpose and is therefore 
reasonable. Id. at 1452–53. 
 52 Id. at 1457. See, e.g., Util. Air. Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302 (2014) (taking a textual-
ist approach at Chevron Step Two); Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42 (2011) (engaging in arbitrary and 
capricious review at Chevron Step Two); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 (determining that courts, in re-
viewing agency decisions at Step Two of the inquiry, must look to the purpose of the statute that is 
being interpreted to determine reasonableness). 
 53 See Linda Jellum, Chevron’s Demise: A Survey of Chevron from Infancy to Senescence, 59 
ADMIN. L. REV. 725, 726 (2007). The confusion over the correct way to apply Chevron Step One is of 
concern for courts. Id. at 727. Justice Stevens saw Step One as an inquiry into the intent of the legisla-
ture in order to determine whether they had spoken on the issue at hand. Id. at 728. This inquiry fo-
cused on statutory interpretation through methods such as legislative history, purpose, and social con-
text. Id. Soon after Chevron was decided, Justice Scalia ascended to the Court, bringing with him the 
ascendance of textualism. Id.; Jonathan R. Siegel, The Legacy of Justice Scalia and His Textualist 
Ideal, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 857, 858 (2017). Scholars argue that the trend toward prioritizing the 
plain meaning of statutory text over the underlying intention of Congress leads to more frequent find-
ings of statutory ambiguity than Justice Stevens likely envisioned for Chevron. Jellum, supra, at 728. 
 54 See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 835 
(2001) (considering the ways in which Chevron deference has been further complicated and identify-
ing outstanding questions regarding the breadth of its applicability). 
 55 Nicholas R. Bednar & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Inevitability, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1392, 1403–04 (2017). The first Supreme Court decisions that followed Chevron indicate that the 
Court was ambivalent about adhering to Chevron. Id. Justice Scalia, who frequently called for the 
application of Chevron doctrine in such cases, was eventually successful in cementing Chevron as the 
dominant framework and, by 1990, each justice on the Court signed on to at least one opinion that 
followed the Chevron framework. Id. at 1404. 
 56 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court 
Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1088 
(2008) (describing the doctrinal “tug of war” between Justices Stevens and Scalia on the correct con-
ception of Chevron). 
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Mead, decided in 2001, represented a major shift in how Chevron should 
be applied and is seen as a watershed moment in the development of the doc-
trine.57 Mead stands for the presumption that Chevron deference is only appro-
priate where it is clear that Congress has delegated the authority to make law 
to the federal agency in question.58 This implies that a statute must meet a pre-
liminary threshold, known as Chevron Step Zero, before a court can determine 
whether an agency’s interpretation of that statute passes muster.59 Mead envi-
sioned a more robust role for the judiciary in applying Chevron and implied 
that the Court was willing to limit the degree to which it accepted agency ex-
pertise.60 Although Mead sought to create a more concrete framework for low-
er courts to weed out cases where Chevron deference was not appropriate, data 
shows that the haphazard application of Chevron continued after Mead.61 
In 2005, in Brand X, the Court swung back to a broader reading of Chev-
ron doctrine, holding that the agency was permitted to overrule federal court 
precedent of the organic statute at issue.62 Brand X instructs federal circuit 
courts to yield to agency interpretation wherever such an interpretation sur-
vives Chevron, regardless of whether the agency’s interpretation conflicts with 
the court’s own precedent.63 This decision forced federal courts to set aside 
their own previous decisions where they conflicted with a later agency inter-
                                                                                                                           
 57 Bednar & Hickman, supra note 55, at 1408–09. The demonstrable impact of Mead is that since 
the case was decided, the Court has not deferred to agency decisions under Chevron unless they were 
expressed in the form of a regulation issued under APA notice-and-comment procedures or formal 
adjudication. Id. at 1409. Therefore, agency decisions that overcome lesser procedural hurdles, such as 
policy statements or agency guidelines, are reviewed under Skidmore deference rather than Chevron 
deference. Id. 
 58 Mead, 533 U.S. at 226–27, 230–33. 
 59 Thomas W. Merrill, Step Zero After City of Arlington, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 753, 756 (2014). 
Scholars argue that the goal posts for Step Zero are difficult to discern in Mead. Id. Although it re-
mains muddled, Step Zero is an important tool for courts in determining whether it is appropriate to 
move to the two-step Chevron test, because of how frequently courts are forced to decide whether a 
perceived legislative “gap” should be construed as an implied delegation of legislative authority by 
Congress. Id. at 758–59. 
 60 See Craig, supra note 47, at 13 (describing the characteristics of agency decision making that 
courts should consider in determining whether it warranted deference after Mead, namely the process 
by which the agency arrived at its decision and whether the authority they relied upon was legitimate). 
 61 See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 56, at 1128 (aggregating data that demonstrates that courts are 
inconsistent in how they approach agency deference questions). 
 62 See 545 U.S. at 982–83, 1000–03. The Court specified that the federal court precedent only 
trumps an agency interpretation when the court determines that the statute was unambiguous and 
therefore not entitled to Chevron deference in the first place. Id. at 982–83. The reasoning employed 
by the Court in Brand X parallels Chevron, but goes beyond: not only must a court defer to agency 
interpretations, they must also overrule their own previous interpretations when they conflict with 
later interpretive decisions made by federal agencies. Craig, supra note 47, at 18. 
 63 See Brand X, 545 U.S. at 982 (holding that Brand X applies except in circumstances where it is 
found that the terms of the statute are unambiguous and thus there is no gap for the agency to fill with 
its own interpretation). 
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pretation, a missive they resist only in limited circumstances.64 Ironically, the 
Supreme Court has been unwilling to yield when its own precedent conflicts 
with a new agency interpretation.65 
Critics argue that Brand X severely restricts courts’ authority to interpret 
the law and transfers it to the executive branch administrative agencies, posing 
constitutional concerns over violation of separation of powers.66 Nevertheless, 
when agencies alter interpretations previously adopted by administrations with 
different policy objectives, they often cite Brand X to force reviewing courts to 
accept these reinterpretations.67 When this occurs, critics are even more in-
clined to accuse agencies of using the doctrine to execute political objectives 
rather than accurately interpret the underlying statute.68 Notwithstanding this 
                                                                                                                           
 64 Craig, supra note 47, at 18–19. A lower court might refuse to apply Brand X to overrule its 
own precedent for one of two reasons. Id. The court might consider the precedent so well-established 
that it essentially leaves the statute unambiguous and therefore no longer eligible for Chevron defer-
ence. Id. Alternatively, a lower court might decline to apply Brand X where it has already considered 
the agency interpretation in the past and ruled it unreasonable under Chevron. Id. at 20. Circuit courts 
are unwilling to allow agencies to use Brand X to evade a previous decision that an agency decision 
failed a Chevron challenge. Id. at 21. 
 65 See id. at 21–22 (citing Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, 557 U.S. 519, 535–36 (2009)) (refus-
ing to overrule Supreme Court precedent interpreting enforcement of National Bank Act regulations). 
In Cuomo, the majority, in a footnote, raises—and disregards—the dissent’s contention that Brand X 
should apply. 557 U.S. at 528 n.2. 
 66 See Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149–50 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., con-
curring) (describing the tension between Brand X and separation of powers as a guard against the 
invasion of the people’s liberties). Then-Judge Gorsuch also noted that Brand X might create due-
process and equal-protection concerns because of fair notice problems—namely, statutory interpreta-
tions can be altered by a federal agency at any time based on a shift in the political winds. Id. at 1152. 
 67 See, e.g., Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. at 327 (noting that the agency is not bound by any previous 
judicial interpretation of a statute and that the agency, not any reviewing court, has the power to re-
solve any statutory ambiguity). AG Sessions cites Brand X to assert that the agency is the ultimate 
authority on the interpretation of immigration legislation. Id. at 326. 
 68 See Harold M. Greenberg, Why Agency Interpretations of Ambiguous Statutes Should Be Sub-
ject to Stare Decisis, 79 TENN. L. REV. 573, 587–88 (2012) (raising constitutional suspicions where 
agencies reinterpret statutes because it looks more like the agency is legislating rather than executing 
the law). One example of the danger of reinterpreting statutes based on political motivations is the 
global gag rule. Id. at 579–80. The global gag rule prohibits any U.S. funding to international non-
governmental organizations that provide abortion services or offer information about abortions. Molly 
Redden, ‘Global Gag Rule’ Reinstated by Trump, Curbing NGO Abortion Services Abroad, THE 
GUARDIAN (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/23/trump-abortion-gag-
rule-international-ngo-funding [https://perma.cc/VN36-7WJV]. Since the Reagan Administration, 
each Republican president has invoked the rule, and each Democratic president has rescinded it. See 
Greenberg, supra, at 579–80 (describing the gag rule put in place by the George H.W. Bush Admin-
istration, rescinded by the Clinton Administration, and reinstituted by the George W. Bush Admin-
istration). The rule changes based on ping-ponging interpretations of the word “method” in Title X of 
the Public Health Services Act as either allowing or disallowing abortion services. Id. at 579. One way 
that the Court might limit Brand X to prevent vast fluctuations between presidential administrations 
and ensure a reasoned process would be to look more seriously at the procedural steps taken by the 
agency in reinterpreting a policy. See Richard W. Murphy, Hunters for Administrative Common Law, 
58 ADMIN. L. REV. 917, 937–38 (2006) (describing the concern that without procedural requirements, 
discretion allows agencies to easily switch between reasonable interpretations in order to make a polit-
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critique, it remains permissible for agencies to reinterpret their previous posi-
tion on the meaning of statutory language as long as the new interpretation 
passes the two-step Chevron test.69 Those who criticize the widening of Chev-
ron deference also highlight the risk of agency turf-grabbing and capture by 
politically motivated administrators.70 
Proponents of Brand X and an expansive Chevron doctrine argue that 
agencies possess qualities that Congress and courts lack, which put them in the 
best position to effectuate congressional intent.71 Namely, those who support a 
broad interpretation of Chevron point to agency advantages such as technical 
expertise, legitimacy of decision making, and adherence to the rule of law.72 
Importantly, proponents argue that putting Congress on notice of Chevron def-
erence provides legitimacy for the deference.73 
Deference is not uniform, however; through a comparative study of Chev-
ron application in a variety of subject matter, scholars have found that there is 
a correlation between the subject and nature of the policy being considered, 
and the frequency and degree of deference a court affords that policy.74 Su-
                                                                                                                           
ically motivated change). For example, where an agency seeks to replace one reasonable statutory 
interpretation with another, the agency should require that the new policy go through notice-and-
comment rulemaking to increase transparency and legitimize the change. Id. at 938. 
 69 Brand X, 545 U.S. at 1001; Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. An agency’s authority to interpret stat-
utes is not subject to stare decisis, meaning an agency can adopt any permissible interpretation of a 
statute at any time, so long as it survives Chevron. Greenberg, supra note 68, at 576. The same two-
step Chevron test, including whether the reversal is reasonable, applies regardless of whether a court 
is considering an original interpretation or a reinterpretation. Id. at 577. 
 70 Connor N. Raso & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Chevron as a Canon, Not a Precedent: An Empir-
ical Study of What Motivates Justices in Agency Deference Cases, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1727, 1730–
31 (2010). The threat of agency capture, wherein interest groups are able to push forth their goals with 
the agencies that are meant to regulate them, often occurs to the detriment of the public interest. Mi-
chael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture, and Agency Inaction, 101 
GEO. L.J. 1337, 1340 (2013). 
 71 See Alina Das, Unshackling Habeas Review: Chevron Deference and Statutory Interpretation 
in Immigration Detention Cases, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 143, 168 (2014) (discussing rationales for Chev-
ron deference proposed by both the Court and academics). 
 72 Raso & Eskridge, supra note 70, at 1730 (noting the legitimacy of deference when Congress 
expressly or impliedly delegates to an agency and that executive agencies are more easily held respon-
sible by the electorate than courts); see also Evan J. Criddle, Chevron’s Consensus, 88 B.U. L. REV. 
1271, 1286 (2008) (discussing a federal agency’s technical knowledge and experience in a particular 
area as a rationale for Chevron deference). 
 73 Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 
511, 517. Justice Scalia himself acknowledged the likelihood that Congress, in leaving statutory gaps, 
did not intend any one particular outcome nor intend for the agency to determine the outcome, but 
rather that they did not strongly consider the impact of any ambiguity. Id. Still, Justice Scalia was 
comfortable with the fictionalized legislative intent that agencies prescribe to Congress through Chev-
ron analysis, because Congress is now aware of the doctrine and knows that any ambiguities it creates 
will be solved by a particular agency rather than the courts. Id. 
 74 See generally Eskridge & Baer, supra note 56, at 1144–47 (aggregating the Chevron decisions 
related to a variety of subject matter and finding them consistent with a hypothesis that subject matter 
impacts how judges approach Chevron problems). 
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preme Court justices appear to weigh their own expertise against the expertise 
held by the agency interpreting a statute when deciding whether deference is 
appropriate.75 The Court tends to afford an agency deference more frequently 
in areas that require politically motivated calculations, such as foreign affairs, 
national security, and immigration, or in areas such as technical and economic 
regulations, which require extensive specialized knowledge.76 In areas where 
justices might see themselves as more knowledgeable, such as procedural rules 
or criminal law, the Court applies Chevron deference less frequently.77 
B. But When Do Courts Step In?: Unreasonableness  
and Arbitrary and Capricious Review 
As described in Section A, there is no consensus as to the appropriate ap-
proach to analysis of agency decision making at Chevron Step Two.78 Yet, schol-
ars point to a trend in the Step Two approach that resembles arbitrary and capri-
cious review, wherein the reviewing court considers a number of factors to as-
certain whether the agency action is justified by sufficient reasoning.79 This may 
be due to the inherent similarities between arbitrary and capricious review and 
the reasonableness inquiry at Chevron Step Two.80 Several scholars have noted 
this similarity and the Court, when performing a Chevron analysis, also implies 
it through reference to arbitrary and capricious review during Step Two.81 
                                                                                                                           
 75 Id. at 1144. Chief Justice John Roberts’ majority opinion in King v. Burwell demonstrates the 
importance that the Court places on subject matter in determining whether Chevron deference is ap-
propriate. See 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (determining that because it is unlikely that Congress 
would delegate health care policy to the IRS, the subject matter involved necessitated a determination 
first that Chevron deference was not appropriate, and second that interpreting the statute fell within 
the purview of the Court). 
 76 Eskridge & Baer, supra note 56, at 1044. 
 77 Id. Behind the refusal of courts to defer under Chevron in criminal law cases is the rule of leni-
ty, which is an anti-deference approach dictating that statutory ambiguities should be interpreted in 
favor of criminal defendants. Id. at 1115. 
 78 See supra notes 50–53 and accompanying text. 
 79 See Barnett & Walker, supra note 50, at 1454–57. Professors Barnett and Walker looked at all 
of the cases considered by the Court that contained Chevron Step Two analysis between 1984 and 
2016, and found that five out of eight clearly contained arbitrary and capricious review. Id. at 1457. 
 80 See id. at 1454 (noting that many scholars have made the connection between Chevron Step 
Two and arbitrary and capricious review); see also Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step 
Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1253, 1254–55 (1997) (describing the overlap between 
arbitrary and capricious review and Chevron Step Two); Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration 
After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2105 (1990) (arguing that the Step Two reasonableness 
inquiry should resemble arbitrary and capricious review). 
 81 See supra note 80 and accompanying text, see also Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 52 n.7 
(2011) (determining that the outcome would be the same if analyzed under Chevron Step Two or 
arbitrary and capricious review); Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 
44, 53 (2011) (noting that when conducting Chevron analysis at Step Two, a court looks at whether 
the agency decision is arbitrary and capricious); Mead, 533 U.S. at 229 (quoting the APA’s arbitrary 
and capricious provision after outlining Chevron Step Two). 
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Many of the relevant factors in arbitrary and capricious review were ar-
ticulated in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automo-
bile Insurance Co.82 The Court articulated additional factors in two other cas-
es. In Judulang v. Holder, the Court dictated that a decision is arbitrary and 
capricious where it is not sufficiently tied to the purpose of the law on which it 
is based, or if the rule will lead to decisions that vary based on the adjudicator, 
or if the agency fails to distinguish past precedent that conflicts with the cur-
rent decision.83 In Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, the 
Court added that an agency’s refusal to regulate when instructed to by statute 
may constitute arbitrary and capricious behavior.84 
Despite the extensive list of factors the Court has articulated in its arbi-
trary and capricious jurisprudence, the Court has repeatedly reiterated that ar-
bitrary and capricious review is ultimately narrowed by deference to agency 
decisions.85 This narrowness is emphasized because the Court continues to 
adhere to the belief that agencies are often in a better position than courts to 
administer statutes.86 The frequent conflation of the analysis under arbitrary 
and capricious review and at Chevron Step Two is the result of a general 
agreement that the factors considered under arbitrary and capricious review are 
essentially testing the reasonableness of an agency decision, and are thus high-
ly relevant in the Step Two realm.87 Although there is a strong argument for 
this approach, some note that the inconsistency and lack of consensus regard-
ing the appropriate analysis at Step Two adds to the inconsistency and incoher-
ency of the Chevron doctrine.88 
                                                                                                                           
 82 See 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (determining that a court must consider whether an agency looked 
at all relevant factors in choosing a policy). The factors included whether the agency relied on infor-
mation that Congress did not mean for it to consider, whether the agency offered an explanation for the 
policy that did not accord with the evidence before it, whether the agency did not consider an important 
facet of the issue, and whether the conclusion was so implausible that it could not be justified by differ-
ences in expertise or policy views. Id. 
 83 See 565 U.S. at 55, 57–58, 62–63 (determining that the Department of Justice (DOJ) immigra-
tion policy did not pass arbitrary and capricious review based on an analysis of relevant factors). 
 84 See 549 U.S. 497, 534–35 (2007) (finding that, based on the Environmental Protection Agen-
cy’s statutory obligation to respond to any finding of endangerment under the Clean Air Act, the 
agency did not provide a sufficiently reasoned explanation for its refusal to respond to concerns about 
greenhouse gases, and the action was therefore arbitrary and capricious). 
 85 See, e.g., Judulang, 565 U.S. at 52–53 (noting that arbitrary and capricious review is narrow in 
scope and that courts cannot override the reasoned judgement of agencies); Massachusetts, 549 U.S. 
at 527 (noting that review of agency action based on their statutory mandate is narrow). 
 86 See, e.g., State Farm, 463 U.S. at 42–43 (noting that arbitrary and capricious review is limited 
to whether the decision was based upon a set of reasonable factors and does not allow courts to substi-
tute their own judgment). 
 87 Supra notes 79–81 and accompanying text (describing the similarities between arbitrary and 
capricious review and Chevron Step Two). 
 88 See Beermann, supra note 32, at 741–44 (describing the unclear boundaries between Chevron 
deference, Skidmore deference, and arbitrary and capricious review, and lamenting the inability of 
parties to predict under which standard an agency decision will ultimately be reviewed). 
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C. What Does the BIA Know? Why and When We Defer  
to Agency Decision Making 
Brand X and Chevron are relevant in the immigration space when one 
party in deportation proceedings appeals an agency decision in federal court.89 
Noncitizens who petition for relief from deportation proceedings are heard first 
by an immigration judge.90 Once the immigration judge issues a decision, ei-
ther party may appeal the decision to the BIA.91 The BIA is the adjudicative 
body within the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), which is 
the Department of Justice (DOJ) subsidiary that oversees immigration litiga-
tion.92 After the BIA issues a decision, the case may be appealed in federal 
court.93 
Immigration cases make up the vast majority of administrative law cases 
that come before federal courts, and there is a strong trend of deference toward 
agency decisions.94 The Court tends to afford a high level of deference to BIA 
and AG interpretations of immigration statutes, premised on the belief that 
                                                                                                                           
 89 See, e.g., Judulang, 565 U.S. at 45 (considering whether an agency’s interpretation of an immi-
gration statute was reasonable); see also Shruti Rana, Chevron Without the Courts?: The Supreme 
Court’s Recent Chevron Jurisprudence Through an Immigration Lens, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 313, 
343–45 (2012) (discussing the shift in immigration jurisprudence towards agency deference based on 
the application of Chevron and Brand X). Chevron is highly relevant in immigration law because of 
the huge volume of immigration cases that are appealed in the federal courts. Id. at 345. 
 90 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXEC. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION REVIEW, BOARD OF IMMIGRATION AP-
PEALS PRACTICE MANUAL § 4.2(a) (2020) [hereinafter BIA PRACTICE MANUAL], https://www.
justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1250701/download [https://perma.cc/A48C-THRV]. Both the BIA and immi-
gration courts are administered by the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), which is a 
subsidiary of the DOJ. Id. § 1.2(b). 
 91 Id. § 4.2(a)(ii). 
 92 Executive Office of Immigration Review, About the Office, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE (Oct. 15, 
2018), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/about-office [https://perma.cc/G7Y4-5629]. The BIA consists of 
twenty-one members, who are appointed by the Attorney General. BIA PRACTICE MANUAL, supra 
note 90, § 1.3(a). 
 93 BIA PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 90, § 1.4(h). Published BIA decisions are binding on the 
parties, on future cases before the BIA, on immigration courts, and on the DHS. Id. § 1.4(d)(i). In 
addition to the regular procedures for adjudicating an immigration appeal, the AG may choose to issue 
a separate opinion that overrules the BIA, should the AG office disagree. Id. § 1.4(g). The AG is re-
ferred BIA cases at the request of the AG. Id. The DOJ argues that under Brand X, deference to its 
agencies’ interpretations is appropriate, regardless of whether federal courts of jurisdiction have prec-
edent that conflicts with such an interpretation. Rana, supra note 89, at 347. Even in cases where no 
statutory ambiguity for the agency to interpret is firmly established, courts tend to defer to immigra-
tion agency interpretations. Id. at 348. 
 94 See Rana, supra note 89, at 313 (noting that immigration cases make up 90% of administrative 
law cases heard in federal court and that courts tend to ask whether deference is appropriate rather 
than whether the agency is correctly interpreting the relevant statute). Scholars note that there is a lack 
of robust review by the BIA due to an overwhelming caseload. Id. at 318. The BIA often hands down 
brief summary affirmations of lower immigration court decisions without any reasoned analysis, and 
yet federal courts continue to support the BIA under Chevron. Id. at 318–19. 
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they possess more specialized knowledge than federal courts.95 Additionally, 
courts are encouraged to rely on agency decisions in order to streamline the 
process and make it more efficient, eliminating contradictory precedent to pro-
duce consistent results in immigration cases that raise similar issues.96 Never-
theless, the current volume of cases heard by agency decisionmakers, and the 
inconsistent outcomes they produce, leads practitioners to conclude that broad 
deference is not being implemented as intended.97 In practice, the application 
of Chevron and Brand X could create uncertainty because the BIA decisions 
that outline certain immigration requirements, such as what groups are suffi-
ciently socially distinct in asylum cases, have changed over time and resulted 
in circuit splits.98 The backlog of immigration cases is steadily growing—in 
2009, the average wait time for a case pending in immigration court was 430 
                                                                                                                           
 95 Rana, supra note 89, at 334; see Jeffrey S. Chase, The BIA vs. The Supreme Court?, OPIN-
IONS/ANALYSIS ON IMMIGR. L. (Dec. 24, 2018), https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2018/9/1/the-
bia-vs-the-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/38SQ-WAMU] (describing the impact of strong Chevron 
deference in immigration court). In addition to specialized knowledge and expertise, Chevron defer-
ence is premised on the belief that agencies tend to be more politically accountable than judges, who 
are protected because of their Article III lifetime tenures. Rana, supra note 89, at 324, 334. Neverthe-
less, agency adjudication may be influenced by other politically motivated moves—for example, in 
2002, Republican-appointed AG John Ashcroft reduced the size of the BIA from twenty-three to elev-
en members and removed many members who were selected by his predecessor, who was a Demo-
crat. Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. 
REV. 295, 352 (2007). The members removed did not correspond with seniority. Id. 
 96 Rana, supra note 89, at 324. 
 97 See, e.g., Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 95, at 296, 301 (describing the inconsistent result 
among different adjudicators and suggesting that reforms are necessary in immigration adjudication to 
streamline results). For example, Colombian applicants whose cases were heard in Miami had a 5% 
chance of a positive outcome with one immigration judge and an 88% chance of success with one of 
his colleagues sitting in the same courthouse. Id. at 296. It is difficult to determine the degree of de-
viation between individual members of the BIA because the agency does not keep records that indi-
cate which individual members participated in which decision as they do for immigration judges and 
asylum officers. Id. at 354. Still, it is clear that the success rate for asylum applicants has decreased 
significantly—in 2009, 29.11% of applicants who applied for asylum were denied, while in 2018 the 
denial rate increased to 41.82%. EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION APPEALS, IMMIGRATION COURT 
STATISTICS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2018 (May 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/
1060936/download [https://perma.cc/L6N7-FLZR]. 
 98 Bednar, supra note 13, at 374–75. One major barrier to asylum applicants, particularly those 
who are unrepresented by counsel, is determining the appropriate evidence required to be granted 
asylum. Id. at 362. It is difficult to discern what evidence will be required because shifting case law 
over the years has changed what constitutes sufficient evidence in an asylum case. Id. In addition, 
adjudicators determine the existence of a PSG on a case-by-case basis, so an adjudicator is free to find 
in favor of one applicant who relies solely on testimony, but find against another with similar facts. Id. 
Although circuit courts are largely deferential to the BIA’s evolving PSG standards, the Third and 
Seventh Circuits have raised concerns regarding the utility of the criteria of particularity and social 
distinction. Id. at 379. 
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days; in 2019, it was 736 days, indicating that the agency process is not be-
coming more efficient.99 
In addition, the degree of deviation between immigration courts with re-
spect to petitions for asylum suggests that the outcome of a noncitizen’s case 
depends not on their legal argument, but instead on the judge they are random-
ly assigned.100 The subjective nature of the asylum elements has led to incon-
sistent results both in immigration courts and upon review by the BIA.101 This 
is what led to the circuit split, as some federal circuit courts have refused to 
defer to the agency’s definition of a PSG, determining that the BIA’s interpre-
tation of the statute is unreasonable.102 
II. ONE STEP FORWARD, TWO STEPS BACK: THE DOJ’S TREATMENT  
OF PSG CLAIMS BASED ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
In Matter of A-B-, AG Sessions severely limited the viability of asylum 
claims wherein victims of domestic violence assert persecution based on mem-
bership in a PSG.103 This was a departure from the BIA approach in Matter of A-
R-C-G- and exemplifies the volatile nature of the DOJ’s response to asylum 
claims rooted in private, gender-based violence.104 This Part will trace the histo-
ry of gender-based asylum claims, from how they were addressed by agencies 
beginning in the mid-to-late 1990s to their status after Matter of A-B-.105 Section 
A will discuss the major gender-based asylum cases decided prior to Matter of 
A-R-C-G-, as well as the response from immigration advocates to these cases.106 
Section B will discuss the evolution of the requirements for asylum based on 
membership in a PSG, focusing on the reasoning and the path forward for those 
with gender-based asylum claims.107 Section C will discuss Matter of A-B-, in-
                                                                                                                           
 99 Average Time Pending Cases Have Been Waiting in Immigration Courts as of November 2018, 
TRAC IMMIGR. (Nov. 2018), http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court_backlog/apprep_backlog_
avgdays.php [https://perma.cc/6WVM-TM46]. 
 100 Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 95, at 302. 
 101 See Bednar, supra note 13, at 362, 388 (describing the case-by-case nature of adjudication of 
asylum claims based on membership in a PSG and the concerns this raises about the BIA’s consisten-
cy in considering cases); infra notes 157–158 and accompanying text. 
 102 Sternberg, supra note 26, at 270; see infra notes 158–160 and accompanying text. 
 103 See 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 317, 320 (A.G. 2018) (noting that only under “exceptional circum-
stances” can violence perpetrated by non-state actors meet the requirements for asylum). 
 104 See 26 I. & N. 388, 392–95 (B.I.A 2014) (determining that the respondent’s claim met all of 
the requirements of a successful asylum claim); Bachmair, supra note 15, at 1058–59 (discussing the 
inconsistent outcomes of gender-based violence claims and the tendency for outcomes to differ based 
on an adjudicator’s understanding of the elements of an asylum claim). 
 105 See infra notes 109–207 and accompanying text. 
 106 See infra notes 109–144 and accompanying text. 
 107 See infra notes 145–169 and accompanying text. 
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cluding AG Sessions’ authority to decide the case, grounds for overturning it, 
and how practitioners are approaching similar claims going forward.108 
A. Grappling with Gender Based Claims: Early Advocacy Makes  
Tentative Inroads and the Saga of In re R-A- 
The requirements for asylum were first outlined in the Refugee Act of 
1980, which authorizes the AG to grant asylum to an individual unable to re-
turn to her home country because she has suffered past persecution (or has a 
well-founded fear of future persecution on account of a protected ground).109 
The United States’ obligation to accept valid asylum claims comes from its 
ratification of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (the 
Convention) and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.110 
Historically, noncitizens who assert gender-based asylum claims are un-
successful.111 Applicants have experienced some small steps forward in assert-
ing their claims, but results remain inconsistent.112 Part of the reason for this 
struggle lies in the exclusion of gender as an explicitly protected group for asy-
lum in both domestic and international law.113 Because asylum statutes do not 
specifically discuss gender as a protected group, either in United States immi-
                                                                                                                           
 108 See infra notes 170–207 and accompanying text. 
 109 Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, §§ 102, 201, 208, 94 Stat. 102, 102–05 (codified as 
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2018)). Prior to the passage of the Refugee Act, there were refu-
gees admitted to the United States; however, Congress handled admission on a piecemeal basis in 
response to international crises. Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., America’s Schizophrenic Immigration Policy: 
Race, Class, and Reason, 41 B.C. L. REV. 755, 765 (2000). For example, the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act of 1965 provided refugee status to only those who escaped countries under communist rule 
or countries in the Middle East. Id. 
 110 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267; 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 1(A), July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6577, 189 U.N.T.S. 
150, 151–52. 
 111 See Michael G. Heyman, Asylum, Group Membership and the Non-State Actor: The Challenge 
of Domestic Violence, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 767, 790 (2003) (describing the failure of asylum 
adjudicators to protect victims of domestic violence from persecution). Scholars contextualize the 
arguments for and against asylum in such cases as representative of two different views regarding the 
suffering of domestic violence victims: one view is that the suffering is personal, the other is that it is 
a product of the culture. Id. at 795. 
 112 Laura S. Adams, Fleeing the Family: A Domestic Violence Victim’s Particular Social Group, 
49 LOY. L. REV. 287 (2003). Although state actors do not inflict domestic violence, many govern-
ments do not provide sufficient protection for those who are victimized by their parents, spouses, or 
intimate partners. Id. at 288. Some of the proposed social groups for those who experience domestic 
violence and wish to seek asylum include women, children, or victims of domestic violence. Id. at 
293. The latter was accepted by Australia and Canada as the basis for granting asylum. Id. The distinc-
tion between other nations who accept “victims of domestic violence” as a PSG for asylum and the 
United States is that U.S. courts are unwilling to accept the circular reasoning that domestic violence 
victims are persecuted because they are victims of domestic violence. Id. at 294–95. 
 113 See Karen Musalo, Revisiting Social Group and Nexus in Gender Asylum Claims: A Unifying 
Rationale for Evolving Jurisprudence, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 777, 781–82 (2003) (describing the chal-
lenges that arise when women assert asylum claims based on gender-based violence). 
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gration law or in the Convention, women asserting gender-based claims of vio-
lence face the same barriers that victims of domestic violence traditionally 
face, in that the law sees the harm to which they are subjected as not worthy of 
public concern.114 This is because such claims almost always involve harms 
perpetrated by non-state actors, such as family or community members.115 
Women asserting asylum claims must not only show that the harm they 
endured amounted to persecution rather than a personal vendetta, but also that 
the harm was on account of membership in a protected group and that the gov-
ernment was “unable or unwilling” to stop the perpetrators of the harm.116 Ap-
plicants must also fit their claims into one of the five statutorily recognized 
categories (gender is not included), the most common of which is persecution 
based on membership in a PSG.117 Although immigration advocates argue that 
women who have experienced spousal abuse should be eligible for asylum 
based on their gender alone, courts are reluctant to allow such a broad catego-
ry, and thus applicants must define their group in a different way.118 
On May 26, 1995, the DOJ issued guidance titled “Considerations for 
Asylum Officers Adjudicating Asylum Claims for Women” (the Considera-
tions), intending to provide criteria for immigration courts to consider with 
regard to gender-based applications.119 This guidance was not binding on im-
migration judges, the BIA, or federal circuit courts, but could be used persua-
sively in considering such asylum claims.120 Immigration advocates generally 
                                                                                                                           
 114 See id. (discussing the challenges that women face in asserting claims, both because of cultural 
views regarding gender-based violence and because gender is not included as a protected group in 
international asylum law). Beyond the issue of the statutory exclusion of gender, cultural barriers keep 
women from successfully asserting claims of gender-based violence. Id. Adjudicators may be hesitant 
to issue favorable decisions where women have experienced harm based on religious or cultural 
norms, such as female genital mutilation. Id. 
 115 See T.S. Twibell, The Development of Gender as a Basis for Asylum in United State Immigra-
tion Law and Under the United Nations Refugee Convention: Case Studies of Female Asylum Seekers 
from Cameroon, Eritrea, Iraq and Somalia, 24 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 189, 208 (2010) (noting that gen-
der-based persecution is usually perpetrated by non-state actors). 
 116 Id. Although there is no technical difference in the requirements for gender-based asylum 
claims and other claims based on membership in a PSG, cultural and political resistance to such 
claims is an additional barrier that may influence these asylum decisions. Id. at 209. 
 117 Id. at 208. 
 118 See Bachmair, supra note 15, at 1063 (discussing the limiting effect of the “particularity” 
requirement, which limits the creation of PSGs that include large and diffuse sectors of society). Un-
der this argument, “women” as a group should be recognized as a PSG because they are sufficiently 
particular, identifiable, and share common social characteristics within a society. Sarah Siddiqui, 
Membership in a Particular Social Group: All Approaches Open Doors for Women to Qualify, 52 
ARIZ. L. REV. 505, 526 (2010). They thus fulfill the basic requirements of the PSG definition. Id. 
 119 PHYLLIS COVEN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CONSIDERATIONS FOR ASYLUM OFFICERS ADJUDI-
CATING CLAIMS FROM WOMEN (1995). 
 120 Karen Musalo, A Short History of Gender Asylum in the United States: Resistance and Ambiv-
alence May Very Slowly Be Inching Towards Recognition of Women’s Claims, 29 REFUGEE SURV. Q. 
46, 52–53 (2010). Several years after DOJ issued the Considerations, the UNHCR issued its own 
Gender Guidelines. Id. at 51–52. The UNHCR Gender Guidelines state their position that, interpreted 
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supported the Considerations, which noted that serious physical harm that ac-
cumulates or intensifies over time could rise to the level of persecution.121 
The Considerations acknowledged one of the most difficult issues that 
arises in gender-based claims: the nexus requirement.122 The nexus require-
ment necessitates that the claimant show that the protected ground—in this 
case, the claimant’s gender—is the motivation for the persecution.123 The prac-
tical reason this element is difficult to prove is illustrated by the Supreme 
Court’s decision in INS v. Elias-Zacarias, wherein the Court found that there 
must be a nexus between the membership in the proposed group and the pri-
vate actor’s motive in persecuting the asylum applicant.124 The evidentiary 
burden of proving the motivation of a persecutor is often extremely difficult 
for applicants to meet, as it requires more than a showing that they are likely to 
be harmed on account of their membership in a protected group, but also an 
inquiry into the state of mind of the persecutor.125 
In 1996, shortly after the DOJ disseminated the Considerations, the BIA 
decided In re Kasinga, seemingly indicating that gender-based claims were 
gaining traction in immigration court.126 The BIA found a cognizable PSG in 
the group defined as, “young women who are members of the Tchamba-
Kunsuntu Tribe of northern Togo who have not been subjected to female geni-
tal mutilation (FGM), as practiced by that tribe, and who oppose the prac-
                                                                                                                           
properly, the definition of refugee covers gender-based claims. Id. at 51. These guidelines specifically 
reference domestic violence, along with other forms of abuse, as falling within the definition of perse-
cution. Id. They did not recommend that gender itself be added as an additional ground for asylum, 
aside from the existing five categories, but indicated that many gender-based claims would fall under 
the PSG category. Id. Like the UNHCR Gender Guidelines, the Considerations also referenced do-
mestic violence as a potential form of persecution. Id. at 53. 
 121 See id. at 53 (noting that the Considerations are by and large helpful in their attitude towards 
gender-based claims); COVEN, supra note 119, at 2. 
 122 COVEN, supra note 119, at 10. The nexus requirement is otherwise known as the “on account 
of” requirement. Id. 
 123 See Christian Cameron, Note, Why Do You Persecute Me? Proving the Nexus Requirement for 
Asylum, 18 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 233, 234 (2011) (describing the nexus requirement). 
Establishing this nexus is necessary for a successful asylum application because it is part of the definition 
of “refugee” found in the INA. Refugee Act of 1980, § 102. 
 124 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992); Adams, supra note 112, at 293–94. 
 125 William John Wingert, Closing the Door on Asylum-Seekers: Persecution on Account of Polit-
ical Opinion after INS v. Elias Zacarias, 13 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 287, 305–06 (1993). The Su-
preme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit in INS v. Elias-Zacarias. Id. The Ninth Circuit handles a large 
percentage of immigration appeals and had a high rate of asylum grants compared to other federal 
circuits at the time. Id. at 288 n.14. The United Nations disagreed with the Supreme Court’s decision; it 
submitted a brief arguing that the case was wrongly decided because it contravenes the international 
asylum standards. Id. at 307 (noting that the UNHCR’s amicus brief argued that the asylum standard 
established in the case was too stringent and incorrectly found that coerced political activity could 
deem an applicant ineligible for asylum). 
 126 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 357 (B.I.A. 1996); Musalo, supra note 120, at 55–56. In May of 1995 the 
United States issued the Considerations, and the In re Kasinga respondent arrived in the United States 
to seek asylum in December of that same year. 21 I. & N. Dec. at 357; Musalo, supra note 120, at 53. 
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tice.”127 In its finding, the BIA noted that the PSG was united by immutable 
characteristics and that the respondent had a well-founded fear of persecution 
should she return to Togo.128 The BIA also found that the nexus requirement 
was satisfied because FGM is practiced on account of an individual’s member-
ship in the social group.129 
In contrast, the case of In re R-A-, decided by the BIA in 1999, exempli-
fies the barriers that women asserting gender-based asylum claims often 
face.130 The respondent claimed that she was persecuted based on the PSG of 
“Guatemalan women who have been involved with Guatemalan male compan-
ions, who believe that women are to live under male domination.”131 In her 
claim, the respondent described the years of abuse that she endured from her 
husband, whom she married at the age of sixteen.132 An immigration judge de-
cided that the respondent fulfilled the statutory requirements and granted asy-
lum, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) appealed the deci-
sion to the BIA.133 In its analysis, the BIA acknowledged the sympathetic facts 
                                                                                                                           
 127 21 I. & N. Dec. at 357. In re Kasinga was the first case where the BIA recognized female 
genital mutilation (FGM) as persecution. See id. at 358 (noting several findings in the respondent’s 
case, including a finding that FGM constitutes persecution); Female Genital Cutting, CTR. FOR GEN-
DER & REFUGEE STUD., https://cgrs.uchastings.edu/our-work/female-genital-cutting [https://perma.cc/
S8B8-XG8U] (noting that In re Kasinga is the first BIA decision that established asylum eligibility 
for women who fear persecution in the form of FGM). In its opinion, the BIA cited the Considera-
tions, which lists FGM as one of the potential forms of persecution in gender-based asylum claims. 21 
I. & N. Dec. at 362 (citing COVEN, supra note 119, at 4). 
 128 In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 365. Specifically, the BIA applied the PSG test from Matter 
of Acosta to determine that the characteristics of “young women” and “member of the Tchamba-
Kunsuntu Tribe” are unchangeable. Id. at 366 (citing 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985)). The 
BIA also noted young women should not be required to change the characteristic of maintaining intact 
genitalia because it is fundamental to their identity. Id. The BIA found that the respondent had a well-
founded fear of persecution because any reasonable person would, under the circumstances, fear per-
secution should they be forced to return to Togo. Id. 
 129 Id. at 367. In determining that the In re Kasinga respondent met the nexus requirement, the 
BIA reasoned that FGM was conducted in order to exert control over the sexuality of women, and 
thus the persecution feared by her was “on account of” her membership in the prescribed PSG. Id. 
 130 See 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (B.I.A. 1999). 
 131 Id. at 907. 
 132 See id. at 908–10 (describing acts of physical and sexual violence perpetrated against the re-
spondent by her husband, her inability to flee, and the failure of the Guatemalan police to respond to 
or prevent the abuse). She also included country conditions information, citing attitudes towards domes-
tic abuse in Latin America as well as a lack of resources for battered women, including failure to respond 
to reports of domestic violence or to prosecute these crimes. See id. at 910–12 (referencing information 
submitted by the respondent describing attitudes towards domestic violence in Guatemalan society). 
 133 See id. at 911 (describing the immigration judge’s finding that the respondent’s PSG was cog-
nizable and that the respondent was targeted by her abuser based on her resistance to his power and 
dominance over her). The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) ceased to exist in February of 
2003; its duties were divided and absorbed into three different bureaus of the newly created Depart-
ment of Homeland Security. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., OVERVIEW OF INS HISTORY 
11 (2012), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/History%20and%20Genealogy/Our%20
History/INS%20History/INSHistory.pdf [https://perma.cc/PUW9-U5BX]. 
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of the case and found both that the harm suffered by the applicant rose to the 
level of persecution and that the government of Guatemala was “unable or un-
willing” to control such persecution.134 Despite this finding, the BIA ultimately 
held that the respondent’s claim could not succeed because it failed the nexus 
requirement: they were not convinced that the respondent was harmed on ac-
count of her membership in a PSG.135 
The In re R-A- decision was widely criticized by immigration advocates, 
and on December 7, 2000, the INS issued a proposed rule to address these crit-
icisms.136 Based on the proposed rule, then-AG Janet Reno vacated the BIA 
decision and remanded it for reconsideration following final publication in the 
federal register.137 The proposed rule guided judges as to the definitions of per-
secution, membership in a PSG, and the requirements for what constitutes per-
secution of a protected characteristic under refugee law.138 It also emphasized 
that gender or status in a domestic relationship may form the basis of a PSG, 
even though a woman’s abuser is only motivated to harm one member of the 
group that shares this characteristic.139 
Before the rule could be finalized, George W. Bush was elected president, 
and the Bush administration stopped its implementation.140 Because the pro-
posed rule was never published, the BIA and federal courts continued to come 
to inconsistent results on similar claims because they never got any concrete 
guidance from the agency.141 During the Obama administration, respondent R-
                                                                                                                           
 134 In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. at 914. 
 135 Id. The BIA noted that it appeared that the PSG was created for the purposes of the asylum claim 
and that there was insufficient evidence that women who are victims of domestic violence or their male 
perpetrators see them as part of such a group. Id. at 918. 
 136 Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588 (proposed Dec. 7, 2000). The pro-
posed regulation was designed not only to address the issues created by In re R-A-, but a variety of 
issues present in the area of asylum. Heyman, supra note 111, at 778–79. Recognizing that BIA deci-
sions and federal court decisions addressing the definition of a PSG were in conflict with each other, 
the regulation sought to lay out a more uniform set of factors that courts could consider in making 
these determinations. Id. at 779. Some of the factors include group affiliation, collective motive or 
interest, consensual association between members of a proposed group, whether the group is recog-
nized by the society or population of the country in question, whether members define themselves as 
part of the group, and whether membership in the group leads them to be singled out for disparate 
treatment within the society in question. Id. One of the reasons that In re R-A- was so widely criticized 
was that, although the case concerned domestic violence in particular, the BIA’s reasoning seemed to 
impact all gender-based claims involving persecution by private actors that the state cannot or will not 
control. Musalo, supra note 120, at 58. 
 137 See In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. at 906 (vacating the BIA decision and remanding the respondent’s 
case for reconsideration once the final proposed rule was published in the federal register). 
 138 Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,588. 
 139 Id. at 76,593. 
 140 Twibel, supra note 115, at 289. In 2004, AG Ashcroft received a brief from DHS wherein it 
agreed to stipulate that the respondent of In re R-A- should be granted asylum and indicated that it 
planned to work with the DOJ to finalize the proposed rule. Id. at 290. 
 141 Siddiqui, supra note 118, at 531 (describing the inconsistency between the In re R-A- reason-
ing and the approach employed by some circuit courts). In Matter of A-R-C-G-, the BIA specifically 
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A-’s case was finally resolved when the government agreed to stipulate that 
she met the requirements for asylum.142 This stipulated conclusion meant that 
advocates still lacked guidance as to the reasoning used to grant the respondent 
asylum.143 After AG Sessions succeeded AG Eric Holder, the government’s 
position seemed to reverse again in Matter of A-B-, with Sessions reviving the 
original rationale from In re R-A-.144 
B. What’s All This Extra Stuff? Reconceiving the Requirements of a 
Particular Social Group and Matter of A-R-C-G- 
After In re R-A-, the BIA decided several other cases that did not specifi-
cally involve domestic violence in their facts but impacted the way domestic 
violence claims are argued.145 When In re R-A- was decided, the standard for 
                                                                                                                           
noted that In re R-A- was no longer pending. Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 391 (B.I.A. 
2014). On September 25, 2008, In re R-A- was remanded for reconsideration in light of recent juris-
prudence. Matter of R-A-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 629, 630–31 (A.G. 2008). The respondent’s application 
was granted in late 2009 after the Obama Administration agreed to recommend her for asylum. Julia 
Preston, U.S. May Be Open to Asylum for Spouse Abuse, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2009), https://www.
nytimes.com/2009/10/30/us/30asylum.html [https://perma.cc/242L-GFV8]. 
 142 Preston, supra note 141. 
 143 See Matter of L-R-, CTR. FOR GENDER & REFUGEE STUD., https://cgrs.uchastings.edu/our-
work/matter-l-r [https://perma.cc/T2KS-3A6Q] (describing the stipulated finding, which provided no 
further guidance as to the reasoning employed by the BIA in coming to its decision). Similarly, in 
Matter of L-R-, upon appeal of a case wherein the respondent had an asylum claim based on domestic 
violence, DHS stipulated that the respondent was eligible for asylum, and she was granted relief in a 
summary order by a San Francisco immigration judge. Id. In an unpublished brief for the case, DHS 
acknowledged that the PSG of “Mexican women in domestic relationships who are unable to leave” 
and “Mexican women who are viewed as property by virtue of their position in a domestic relation-
ship” could meet the social visibility and particularity requirements. Id.; see also Department of 
Homeland Security’s Supplemental Brief at 14, Matter of L-R- (B.I.A. Apr. 13, 2009) [hereinafter 
DHS Supplemental Brief], https://cgrs.uchastings.edu/sites/default/files/Matter_of_LR_DHS_Brief_
4_13_2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/2EYD-6ART] (describing PSGs that DHS believes may meet the 
asylum requirements). Although the respondent was granted asylum after a protracted process, the fact 
that the findings in the case were stipulated meant that the decision is not always adhered to by immi-
gration adjudicators. See Blaine Bookey, Domestic Violence as a Basis for Asylum: An Analysis of 
206 Case Outcomes in the United States from 1994 to 2012, 24 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 107, 140–42 
(2013) (discussing the inconsistent applications of the Matter of L-R- and In re R-A- precedents). 
Accordingly, immigration judges continued to deny PSGs that were virtually identical to Matter of L-
R-, on grounds that the identified PSG lacked sufficient particularity or social distinction, rejecting the 
In re R-A- and Matter of L-R- decisions. Id. at 141–42. 
 144 See infra notes 171–207 and accompanying text (describing the result and response to Matter 
of A-B-). 
 145 See Matter of E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 591, 595 (B.I.A. 2008) (noting that analysis of whether 
a PSG is cognizable should focus on social visibility and other fundamental characteristics within the 
respondent’s home country); Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 585 (B.I.A. 2008) (finding that 
social groups lack particularity where they make up a large and dispersed part of society); In re C-A-, 
23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 960 (B.I.A. 2006) (determining that particular social groups should be defined by 
characteristics that are both observable and identifiable by individuals in the respondent’s home coun-
try). Although these cases implied that PSGs must be physically visible, the BIA attempted to clarify 
the visibility requirements discussed in all three of these cases by reframing the element as “social 
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PSG required only that the PSG be composed of members who share a com-
mon immutable characteristic.146 The BIA later added the requirements of “so-
cial visibility” and “particularity.”147 
The social visibility requirement posed an obstacle for gender-based 
claims in that many of the groups previously recognized by the BIA, such as 
women who have or have not undergone FGM, do not possess characteristics 
that are visible to the naked eye.148 Later, the BIA attempted to clarify the so-
cial visibility requirement, now known as “social distinction.”149 In Matter of 
W-G-R-, the BIA held that the element of social distinction did not require 
“ocular” visibility, but they must have an immutable trait that defines them.150 
The impact of this change on victims of domestic violence who sought to 
claim asylum was that it clarified that a non-physical trait might be sufficient 
to establish a PSG.151 
In order for a PSG to be sufficiently particular, it must be defined by 
“characteristics that provide a clear benchmark for determining who falls with-
                                                                                                                           
distinction” and noting that ocular visibility is not necessary for a PSG to be viable. Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & 
N. Dec. 208, 216 (B.I.A. 2014). 
 146 Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233–34. 
 147 See Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 212 (describing the particularity and social visibility 
requirements). The social visibility requirement was particularly difficult for advocates to grapple 
with, as there was no clarity as to the definition of the requirement. Musalo, supra note 120, at 60. For 
several years, it was unclear whether the requirement meant that the PSG had to possess characteris-
tics that were visible in the literal sense or the societal and cultural sense. Id. 
 148 Musalo, supra note 120, at 60–61; see also Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615 (7th Cir. 
2009) (indicating that literal visibility does not make sense as a requirement because, for example, 
women who have not undergone FGM or homosexuals who have not come out are not visible in the 
ocular sense, but they have been recognized as members of a PSG by the BIA). 
 149 See Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 212 (adhering to the requirement that social visibil-
ity is required for a cognizable PSG claim, but renaming the element “social distinction” in order to 
clarify its definition). 
 150 See id. at 216 (directing adjudicators to consider whether a PSG is perceived or recognized as 
distinct within a society rather than visible in the ocular sense). The BIA noted in Matter of W-G-R- 
that a number of PSGs previously found cognizable, including that of In re Kasinga, were not ocularly 
visible. Id. at 217. Aside from In re Kasinga, the BIA also referenced cases that found Cuban homo-
sexuals to be a valid PSG, as well as finding that former police officers could constitute a PSG under 
some conditions. Id. (citing Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819, 822–23 (B.I.A. 1990) and 
Matter of Fuentes, 19 I. & N. Dec. 658, 662 (B.I.A. 1988)). The BIA noted that even groups who take 
steps to keep their membership hidden for safety reasons are not deprived of protected status if they 
meet the requirements of a PSG. Id. 
 151 See id. at 217. Although the BIA clarified that social distinction did not require literal visibility, 
immigration judges continued to find that victims of domestic violence did not have cognizable claims. 
Bookey, supra note 143, at 141–42. For example, many asylum applicants arrive from countries that 
ignore or fail to address domestic violence, and at least two decisions hold that failure to address these 
crimes means that their victims are not recognized as a group in the society. See id. at 142 (citing a case 
from India wherein the immigration judge found that the applicant’s PSG lacked social visibility be-
cause only 30% of victims of domestic violence seek assistance from law enforcement authorities). 
An examination of hundreds of asylum adjudications revealed that the outcome of such cases depend-
ed on the view of the particular immigration judge before whom the applicant appeared. Id. at 147–48. 
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in the group.”152 Essentially, the BIA directed adjudicators to determine 
whether the potential PSG as described is subject to different interpretations, or 
whether the description is decisive in determining which individuals are mem-
bers of the group.153 For example, in Matter of S-E-G-, the BIA found that 
“Salvadoran youth who have resisted gang recruitment, or family members of 
such Salvadoran youth” was insufficiently particular because the group was 
too large and diffuse to determine whether gangs targeted members because 
they were identified as part of the group or for some unrelated reason.154 This 
directive poses a problem for gender-based claims, which often include terms 
such as “unable to leave” or “viewed as property.”155 Different adjudicators 
may have different views regarding a term such as “unable to leave” based on 
their personal conceptions of gender-based violence, leading to findings that 
such groups are insufficiently particular.156 In practice, to assess whether an 
individual is “unable to leave” would involve a fact-specific inquiry into the 
ability of a victim of domestic violence to leave a potentially unsafe situation, 
which allows for exactly the type of amorphous, indistinguishable group that 
immigration adjudicators repeatedly hold incognizable.157 
After the BIA added the social distinction and particularity requirements, 
the federal circuit courts had to consider whether to adopt these require-
ments.158 Most deferred per Brand X, with the exception of the Courts of Ap-
peals for the Third and Seventh Circuits, which elected not to adopt the re-
quirements.159 The BIA’s current interpretation of the elements of a cognizable 
                                                                                                                           
 152 Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 239 (B.I.A. 2014). 
 153 Id. 
 154 24 I. & N. Dec. at 584–85; see also In re A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 76 (B.I.A. 
2007) (finding that the terms “wealthy” and “affluent” are too amorphous to determine whether an 
individual is a member of a PSG because they can be interpreted differently by different people). 
 155 Jessica Marsden, Domestic Violence Asylum After Matter of L-R-, 123 YALE L.J. 2512, 2534 
(2014). M-E-V-G- represents a departure from the conception of particularity previously put forth by 
DHS in L-R-. See generally DHS Supplemental Brief, supra note 143. The Supplemental Brief sub-
mitted in that case by DHS indicates the government’s belief that “Mexican women in domestic rela-
tionships who are unable to leave” or “Mexican women who are viewed as property by virtue of their 
positions within a domestic relationship” were sufficiently particular. Id. at 14. The DHS position was 
that these PSGs were sufficiently particular because these proposed groups allow an adjudicator to 
definitively determine whether an individual is or is not a member of the prescribed group. Id. at 19. 
 156 Marsden, supra note 155, at 2535. 
 157 Id. at 2534; see, e.g., Perez-Rabanales v. Sessions, 881 F.3d 61, 66 (1st Cir. 2018) (finding 
that the purported PSG of “Guatemalan women who try to escape systemic and severe violence but 
who are unable to receive official protection” did not meet the social distinction requirement). 
 158 Marsden, supra note 155, at 2531. 
 159 See Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Attorney Gen., 663 F.3d 582, 608 (3d Cir. 2011) (rejecting social 
visibility and particularity); Benitez Ramos v. Holder, 589 F.3d 426, 430 (7th Cir. 2009) (rejecting the 
social visibility requirement); Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615–16 (7th Cir. 2009) (rejecting the 
social visibility test). In Gatimi v. Holder, Judge Posner did not cite Chevron or Brand X but held that the 
BIA provided inadequate reasoning in adding the social visibility requirement to PSG descriptions and 
thus was not entitled to discretion. 578 F.3d at 615–16. Similarly, in Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Attorney 
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PSG are that the group is composed of individuals who share an immutable 
characteristic, are defined with particularity, and are socially distinct within the 
society.160 The first (and only) binding decision that accepted a gender-based 
domestic violence claim under the reconceived definition of PSG was Matter 
of A-R-C-G-.161 In the decision, issued on August 26, 2014, the BIA deter-
mined that “married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their rela-
tionship” was a cognizable PSG for the purposes of asylum under the INA.162 
An immigration judge previously denied the respondent’s application, deter-
mining that the abuse she described constituted criminal acts, not persecution, 
and that she could not meet the requirement that the persecution be on account 
of her membership in an alleged PSG.163 The BIA overturned the immigration 
judge’s decision and determined that the respondent’s PSG was cognizable.164 
                                                                                                                           
General, the Third Circuit determined that the asylum claimant did not have to meet social distinction 
and particularity requirements to prove a cognizable PSG. 663 F.3d at 603–04. The court conducted a 
Chevron analysis and determined that because the new requirements could not be reconciled with previ-
ous BIA cases, including In re Kasinga, they were unreasonable and thus not entitled to deference. Id. at 
604. The court stated that consistency and the ability to reconcile interpretations over time are relevant 
factors in determining whether the agency policy passes Chevron Step Two. Id. The Third Circuit also 
cited INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca in its Chevron analysis for the proposition that inconsistent interpreta-
tion of a statutory provision is entitled to less deference than an agency view that remains constant. Id. 
(citing 480 U.S. 421, 446 n.30 (1987)). 
 160 See Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 392 (laying out the requirements that must be met 
in order for a PSG to be recognized by an adjudicator). 
 161 See id. at 388; Domestic Violence, CTR. FOR GENDER & REFUGEE STUD., https://cgrs.uc
hastings.edu/our-work/domestic-violence [https://perma.cc/772Q-NM3U] (noting that Matter of A-R-
C-G- was the first case in fifteen years that addressed domestic violence as the basis for asylum). 
 162 Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 388–89. The claim was buttressed by a factual back-
ground that detailed years of verbal, physical, and sexual abuse. Id. The respondent repeatedly contacted 
the police and family members for help, but was unable to break free of her husband’s abuse. Id. 
 163 Id. at 389–90 (noting the immigration court distinguished between the abuse the applicant 
experienced and persecution by finding that the abuse was “perpetrated ‘arbitrarily’ and ‘without 
reason,’” and therefore the applicant was not eligible for asylum). 
 164 See id. at 392–95 (analyzing each element of a PSG and determining that the respondent’s 
proffered PSG was cognizable). It found that the immutability requirement was met because gender is 
an immutable characteristic. Id. at 392. The BIA stated that marital status may be immutable where an 
applicant shows that they are “unable to leave the relationship.” Id. at 392–93. An adjudicator may 
consider cultural or legal restraints on the dissolution of marriage in ascertaining whether the respond-
ent is unable to leave. Id. The BIA also conceded that the PSG was defined with particularity based on 
the social and cultural norms of the applicant’s home country. Id. The BIA specifically noted that the 
respondent attempted to seek help from police to stop her husband’s abuse and that the police were un-
willing to protect her because they would not interfere with a marriage. Id. It further found that the PSG 
was socially distinct because of the cultural conditions of Guatemala, specifically the dominant machis-
mo culture, prevalence of family violence, and inability or unwillingness of the police force to adequately 
respond to domestic violence complaints. Id. at 394. A report cited by the BIA in Matter of A-R-C-G- 
notes that in Guatemala, nearly 70% of murders of women go uninvestigated, and in 97% no arrests are 
made at all. Guatemala Failing Its Murdered Women: Report, CBC (July 18, 2006), https://www.cbc.ca/
news/world/guatemala-failing-its-murdered-women-report-1.627240 [https://perma.cc/SV77-2S3U]. 
Machismo culture is prevalent in Guatemala, encouraging gender discrimination and imposing social 
conditions where women occupy a lower status than men within society. Karen Musalo et al., Crimes 
2020] Agency Decision Making and Asylum Claims Involving Domestic Violence 1881 
In its decision, the BIA found that the respondent had met all three require-
ments, albeit on the facts specific to her claim.165 
Matter of A-R-C-G- was a victory for advocates who sought for decades to 
achieve recognition for gender-based asylum claims.166 But the concessions 
made by DHS, as well as repeated proclamations by the BIA that each element 
of the claim needed to be considered on a case-by-case basis, left some advo-
cates wanting.167 Although the Matter of A-R-C-G- precedent seemed favorable, 
it also created a different set of challenges because immigration judges refused 
to accept PSGs that did not match Matter of A-R-C-G- exactly, even if the facts 
were similar.168 Four years later, to the dismay of advocates, Matter of A-R-C-G- 
was overturned by Matter of A-B-, a case initially decided by the BIA on De-
cember 6, 2016, and vacated by AG Sessions during the summer of 2018.169 
C. Back to Square One?: The Death of Matter of A-R-C-G-, the Reasoning 
of Matter of A-B-, and the Response from Practitioners 
Four years after Matter of A-R-C-G-, Donald Trump was elected President 
of the United States; under his leadership there has been a dramatic shift in 
DOJ priorities with regards to immigration.170 President Trump and former AG 
Sessions shared a vision of immigration policy that included a wall spanning 
the entire Mexican border, a crackdown on undocumented immigrants, and a 
marked increase in deportation.171 As a senator, Sessions was known for his 
                                                                                                                           
Without Punishment: Violence Against Women in Guatemala, 21 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 161, 182–
83 (2010). Violence against women may be seen as socially acceptable at best, and, at worst, as a 
positive attribute. Id. As a result, countries that are dominated by machismo culture often experience 
crises in domestic violence and femicide. Id. Instead of challenging this finding, DHS opted to stipulate 
that the respondent’s experiences constituted persecution and that the persecution was on account of her 
membership in a PSG. Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 395. 
 165 See Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec at 388, 392–93 (discussing the government’s conces-
sions that the respondent’s group members share a common immutable characteristic, that it is defined 
with particularity, and that it is socially distinct). 
 166 NAT’L IMMIGRATION JUSTICE CTR., supra note 19, at 5. 
 167 See id. One immigration advocacy group’s practice advisory noted that despite the favorable 
outcome of the case, the analysis of the PSG in Matter of A-R-C-G- was inconsistent with prior BIA 
precedent. Id. 
 168 Id. at 5–6. Even after Matter of A-R-C-G-, some immigration judges continued to deny claims 
involving PSGs that seemed cognizable under the case’s reasoning, including those involving LGBTQ 
people, rape, or unmarried individuals. Id. 
 169 Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. 316, 317 (A.G. 2018). 
 170 See generally Pete Williams, Trump’s Victory—One Year Later: Sessions Remakes Justice 
Department, NBC NEWS (Nov. 12, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/trumps-victory-1-year-
later/trump-s-victory-one-year-later-sessions-remakes-justice-department-n817551 [https://perma.cc/
5S6E-JNP8] (describing changes made to the DOJ under the Trump administration, including in the 
areas of immigration, prosecution of drug offenses, policing policy, and civil rights). 
 171 Jonathan Blitzer, Jeff Sessions Is Out, but His Dark Vision for Immigration Policy Lives On, 
NEW YORKER (Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/jeff-sessions-is-out-but-
his-dark-vision-for-immigration-policy-lives-on [https://perma.cc/5VP4-9X2T]. 
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anti-immigration stance and was instrumental in halting comprehensive immi-
gration reform in 2007 and 2013.172 As AG, Sessions was the primary deci-
sionmaker in such immigration-hostile policies as cancelling Deferred Action 
for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), enforcing family separation at the border, 
attempting to cut off funding for sanctuary cities, enacting the travel bans in 
their various iterations, and reshaping immigration courts.173 
                                                                                                                           
 172 Jonathan Weisman, Senator Tries to Run Out the Clock on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 
2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/18/us/politics/in-round-3-immigration-bill-faces-sessions-who-
won-rounds-1-and-2.html [https://perma.cc/A7FS-H7CJ]. In 2007, Sessions played a leading role in 
the defeat of a bipartisan immigration bill written by Senators Ted Kennedy and John McCain. Id. 
Similarly, in 2013, he was a leading opponent of another reform bill, which was championed by a 
bipartisan group of senators known as the “Gang of Eight.” Id. In 2006, Sessions controversially stat-
ed in a speech on the Senate floor that almost no Dominican immigrants coming to the United States 
have skills that would make them successful or benefit the United States. Id. In a 2015 memo, Sessions 
blamed the Republican loss of the 2012 presidential election in part on the party’s failure to retrench legal 
immigration. Memorandum from Sen. Jeff Sessions to Republican Members, Immigration Handbook 
for the New Republican Majority, at 2–3 (Jan. 2015), https://www.aila.org/File/DownloadEmbedded
File/69750 [https://perma.cc/GML2-B7WT] (outlining Sessions’ immigration platform, which es-
pouses limiting work visas and increasing border control and implies that lax immigration policies 
drive up unemployment of “U.S.-born Americans”). 
 173 See Memorandum from Elaine C. Duke, Acting Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to James 
W. McCament, Acting Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., et al. (Sept. 5, 2017), 
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/09/05/memorandum-rescission-daca [https://perma.cc/ULV5-C38B] 
(declaring that the DACA program, which provided undocumented persons who entered the United 
States before the age of sixteen with a means to obtain work authorization, should be terminated); see 
also Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 30, 2017) (stating that sanctuary cities are no 
longer eligible to receive federal grants); Memorandum from Kevin K. McAleenan et. al., Comm’r, 
U.S. Customs & Border, to Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. at 3 (Apr. 23, 2018), https://www.
documentcloud.org/documents/4936568-FOIA-9-23-Family-Separation-Memo.html [https://perma.
cc/EQ5X-CX84] (stating that it is permissible for DHS to separate parents from their children so that 
parents could be prosecuted for immigration-related offenses); Priscilla Alvarez, Jeff Sessions Is Qui-
etly Transforming the Nation’s Immigration Courts, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 17, 2018), https://www.the
atlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/10/jeff-sessions-carrying-out-trumps-immigration-agenda/573151/ 
[https://perma.cc/46LD-XZPX]. Eventually, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that 
President Trump’s executive order cutting off funding for sanctuary cities was unconstitutional. 
Deanna Paul, Trump’s Order Threatening to Withhold Funding from ‘Sanctuary Cities’ Is Unconstitu-
tional, Court Rules, WASH. POST (Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/
wp/2018/08/01/trumps-order-threatening-to-withhold-funding-from-sanctuary-cities-is-unconstitutional-
court-rules/ [https://perma.cc/8VYN-89JY]. See generally San Francisco v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225 
(9th Cir. 2018) (holding that the executive order violated separation of powers). The third iteration of 
the travel ban was upheld by the Supreme Court. See Sabrina Siddiqui, Trump’s Travel Ban: What 
Does the Supreme Court Ruling Mean?, THE GUARDIAN (June 26, 2018), https://www.theguardian.
com/us-news/2018/jun/26/trump-travel-ban-supreme-court-ruling-explained [https://perma.cc/894U-
NFTM] (noting that the third version of the travel ban limits immigration from Iran, Libya, Syria, 
Somalia, Yemen, North Korea, and Venezuela). Additionally, during AG Sessions’ tenure, he over-
saw a number of changes to the structure and staffing of immigration courts. Alvarez, supra. 
Throughout the Trump administration, critics have levied allegations of politically motivated hiring 
practices for immigration judges. Id. Since the beginning of 2017, the DOJ has hired a total of 128 
immigration judges concentrated in “adjudication centers” in Falls Church, Virginia and Fort Worth, 
Texas, where they hear cases via teleconference. Id. Hiring has been concentrated on those who have 
an immigration enforcement or prosecutorial background rather than one in advocacy, and some ex-
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It is also noteworthy to recognize AG Sessions’ history in regards to poli-
cies intended to protect women who are immigrants.174 As a senator, Jeff Ses-
sions also voted against the 2013 reauthorization of the Violence Against 
Women Act, which included new provisions regarding immigrants.175 Sessions 
stated that he did not support the bill because he thought that the additional 
protections were politically motivated, not genuine attempts to protect women 
from violence.176 
In addition to sweeping policy overhauls, AG Sessions took advantage of 
his power to refer cases to himself even after the BIA has issued its decision.177 
During his tenure of less than two years as AG, Sessions referred eight cases to 
himself and subsequently issued his own precedential legal opinion for each.178 
The AGs for the Bush and Obama administrations, by contrast, only used this 
power a combined thirteen times over sixteen years.179 
One opinion issued by AG Sessions with far-reaching consequences for 
noncitizens applying for asylum was Matter of A-B-.180 The case, decided on 
June 11, 2018, overturned the BIA’s decisions in both Matter of A-B- and Mat-
ter of A-R-C-G-.181 Though his final opinion was contrary to BIA precedent, 
AG Sessions justified it by citing Brand X and Chevron.182 He stated that the 
statutory term “particular social group,” as it appears in the Immigration and 
                                                                                                                           
pressed worry that Sessions is attempting to pack immigration courts with conservative-leaning judges 
who are less likely to decide cases favorably for noncitizens. Id. In addition, AG Sessions issued a 
new mandate that immigration judges must hear at least seven hundred cases per year, increasing 
pressure on adjudicators to decide cases more quickly. Id. 
 174 Amy K. Matsui, Senator Jeff Sessions’s Problematic Record on Women’s Rights, NAT’L WOM-
EN’S L. CTR. (Dec. 20, 2016), https://nwlc.org/blog/sen-jeff-sessions-problematic-record-on-womens-
rights/ [https://perma.cc/32C8-Z2ZE]. The National Women’s Law Center has criticized Sessions’ 
record on the rights of survivors of sexual assault, access to reproductive healthcare, employment dis-
crimination and equal pay, and civil rights. Id. After release of the 2005 Access Hollywood tape featuring 
a recording of Donald Trump talking about grabbing a woman by her genitals, Sessions said of the de-
scribed conduct, “I don’t characterize that as sexual assault.” John McCormack, Jeff Sessions: Behavior 
Described by Trump in ‘Grab Them by the P—y’ Tape Isn’t Sexual Assault, WASH. EXAMINER (Oct. 10, 
2016), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/weekly-standard/jeff-sessions-behavior-described-by-
trump-in-grab-them-by-the-p-y-tape-isnt-sexual-assault [https://perma.cc/9D7L-2HNP]. 
 175 See Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, §§ 801–910, 
127 Stat. 54, 55 (including provisions for the protection of immigrants who are victims of domestic 
violence or abuse). 
 176 Kaitlin Washburn, Violence Against Women Act at Risk of Lapsing, OPENSECRETS.ORG (Oct. 
3, 2018), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2018/10/vawa-at-risk-of-lapsing/ [https://perma.cc/Y6KJ-
ZJXL]. 
 177 Blitzer, supra note 171; see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1)(i) (2018) (granting the Attorney General 
the power to order the BIA to refer any case to himself). 
 178 Blitzer, supra note 171. 
 179 Id. 
 180 See generally 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (determining that an applicant for asylum based on a PSG 
related to domestic violence did not have a cognizable claim); Domestic Violence, supra note 161. 
 181 See generally Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec at 316. 
 182 Id. at 326–27. 
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Nationality Act is unquestionably ambiguous, and thus the agency’s (here, the 
AG’s) construction of the term should control.183 
AG Sessions indicated that he took the case specifically to address the is-
sue of whether being subjected to private violence may be a cognizable PSG 
for the purposes of asylum.184 In so doing, he determined that only under “ex-
ceptional circumstances” may private criminal activity meet the requirements 
of a cognizable PSG.185 He also indicated that violence inflicted by non-state 
actors will rarely meet the requirement that the government is “unable or un-
willing” to control such conduct.186 Ultimately, AG Sessions disagreed with 
the concessions that DHS made in Matter of A-R-C-G-, and he found that the 
BIA did not conduct a thorough analysis of the respondent’s PSG in that 
case.187 Conducting his own analysis, Sessions found that the PSG in Matter of 
A-R-C-G- lacked the requisite particularity and social distinction to be recog-
nized as a cognizable PSG.188 Thus, he overturned the BIA determinations on 
both of these elements.189 He also wrote in his opinion that for an asylum ap-
plicant to prove the “unable or unwilling” element, they must show more than 
the failure of their government to prosecute or investigate private criminal ac-
tivity.190 Finally, Sessions invoked the reasoning from In re R-A- to determine 
that the respondent in Matter of A-R-C-G- did not meet the nexus requirement 
because there was insufficient evidence that her PSG membership motivated 
her husband’s abuse, rather than their preexisting personal relationship.191 Ses-
sions used very similar reasoning to overturn the BIA’s decisions in both Mat-
ter of A-R-C-G- and Matter of A-B-.192 
                                                                                                                           
 183 Id. at 327 (citing Brand X, 545 U.S. at 982). 
 184 NAT’L IMMIGRATION JUSTICE CTR., supra note 19, at 7. After certifying the case to himself, 
AG Sessions requested amicus briefing regarding whether being a victim of private violence may 
constitute a valid PSG for an applicant applying for asylum or withholding of removal. Id. 
 185 Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 317. 
 186 Id. at 320. 
 187 Id. at 331. 
 188 Id. at 335–36. Sessions stated that PSGs defined by their susceptibility to private violence fail 
the particularity requirement outlined in Matter of M-E-V-G-. Id. at 335. Although he acknowledges 
the difficulty of the personal circumstances of Guatemalan women such as the respondent in Matter of 
A-R-C-G-, Sessions found that there was no indication that “married women in Guatemala who are 
unable to leave their relationship” are a group that is recognized by society at large, as is required to 
establish social distinction. Id. at 336. 
 189 Id. at 335–36. It is important to note that this approach does not follow the Third and Seventh 
Circuits, which chose not to adopt the particularity and social distinction requirements. See supra note 
159 and accompanying text. 
 190 Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 337–38. 
 191 Id. at 339 (citing In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 921). 
 192 See generally id. at 340–44 (considering various determinations by the BIA in Matter of A-B- 
and determining that it did not meet the requirements of a successful asylum claim). In his analysis of 
the nexus requirement, Sessions noted that the BIA neither cited any evidence that the respondent’s 
husband was aware of her membership in a PSG nor indicated that her husband did not persecute her 
for any other reason. Id. at 343. One distinction that can be drawn between the two cases is that unlike 
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Immigration advocacy groups and practitioners responded to AG Ses-
sions’ decision with a variety of objections and critiques.193 One of the major 
critiques was that the decision included expansive language that, though tech-
nically dicta, seemed to foreclose any possibility for domestic violence to qual-
ify as a harm that satisfies the asylum nexus requirement.194 Additionally, alt-
hough he cites the “unable or unwilling to control” standard for persecution by 
a non-state actor, Sessions also states in dicta that the government must either 
“condone” the violence or be “completely helpless” to assist victims.195 Immi-
gration advocates worry that Sessions’ intent was to heighten the accepted 
“unable and unwilling” standard for asylum claims that involve private vio-
lence.196 A third prominent criticism of Matter of A-B- is that it potentially 
raises due process concerns for future asylum applicants because it encourages 
government officials to dismiss claims involving domestic violence without 
thoroughly considering the specific facts of each case.197 Finally, although AG 
Sessions cites Brand X and Chevron in justifying his right to overturn a prior 
agency decision, he does not actually change any of the elements of a PSG claim 
described above, and thus some immigration advocates argue that the decision 
does not overrule circuit court precedent, but is instead narrow and limited to 
                                                                                                                           
Matter of A-R-C-G-, the respondent in Matter of A-B- did receive a response when she reported abuse 
to the police and obtained restraining orders, but this did not prevent the abuse from continuing. Id. 
AG Sessions found that although the police did not succeed in preventing the abuse, this did not 
amount to a finding that the government was “unable or unwilling” to control the respondent’s abuser. 
Id. at 343–44. 
 193 See, e.g., IMMIGRANT LEGAL RES. CTR., MATTER OF A-B- CONSIDERATIONS (Oct. 2018), 
https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources/matter_a_b_considerations-20180927.pdf [https://
perma.cc/H5TQ-6XRB] (providing critiques of the reasoning in Matter of A-B- and guidance for prac-
titioners who pursue domestic violence-based claims on behalf of their clients); NAT’L IMMIGRATION 
JUSTICE CTR., supra note 19 (criticizing the rhetoric regarding the nature of domestic violence exhib-
ited in Matter of A-B- and providing practitioners with an explanation of the decision as well as tips 
for bringing similar claims in the future). 
 194 See MATTER OF A-B- CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 193, at 3 (pointing out AG Sessions’ char-
acterization of domestic violence and gang violence as private criminal activity perpetrated against 
individuals who are no more vulnerable to violence or violations of human rights than anyone else 
within society). 
 195 Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 337; see MATTER OF A-B- CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 
193, at 4. 
 196 See generally INS v. Cardoza Fonseca, 480 U.S. 21 (1987) (describing the “unable or unwill-
ing” standard for persecution); see also Thomas v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 1169, 1179 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(noting that when a private, non-state actor is the persecutor, an applicant need not establish that the 
government condoned or promoted the violence), vacated on other grounds, Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 
U.S. 183 (2006); MATTER OF A-B- CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 193, at 4–5 (noting that the “unable 
or unwilling standard” is well-established by precedent and arguing that AG Sessions’ assertion that 
the government needs to condone the persecution is not correct). 
 197 MATTER OF A-B- CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 193, at 5; U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., 
PM-602-0162, GUIDANCE FOR PROCESSING REASONABLE FEAR, CREDIBLE FEAR, ASYLUM, AND REF-
UGEE CLAIMS IN ACCORDANCE WITH MATTER OF A-B- 6, 10 (July 11, 2018) [hereinafter GUIDANCE 
AFTER MATTER OF A-B-], https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/2018/
2018-06-18-PM-602-0162-USCIS-Memorandum-Matter-of-A-B.pdf [https://perma.cc/N24E-PN3F]. 
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Matter of A-B- and Matter of A-R-C-G-.198 No federal circuit court to date has 
issued a decision on a gender-based asylum claim since Matter of A-B-.199 
On the same day that Sessions decided Matter of A-B-, DHS issued guide-
lines for U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) employees to help 
determine asylum eligibility in light of the decision.200 The USCIS guidelines 
instruct that claims involving gang violence or domestic violence will not gener-
ally establish credible or reasonable fear of persecution.201 Based on the Matter 
of A-B- precedent and the new USCIS guidelines, a group of plaintiffs were de-
nied asylum at the credible fear interview stage and brought suit before the Unit-
ed States District Court for the District of Columbia in Grace v. Whitaker.202 
In the case, decided on December 17, 2018, the District Court found that 
despite the government’s argument that Matter of A-B- and the USCIS guide-
lines did not bar all domestic violence claims, the decision and guidelines did 
constitute a blanket rule against all domestic violence claims at the credible 
fear stage.203 The District Court held that the INA’s definition of persecution 
was unambiguous and it did not include the heightened standard used by AG 
Sessions, therefore failing Chevron Step One.204 The District Court held that 
the “unable or unwilling” standard was adopted by Congress and that an agen-
cy could not apply any heightened standard for non-state actors.205 Finally, the 
District Court found that the USCIS guidelines did not warrant deference un-
der Brand X because it was not a permissible interpretation of the INA, and 
                                                                                                                           
 198 NAT’L IMMIGRATION JUSTICE CTR., supra note 19, at 14. 
 199 See Jeffrey S. Chase, IJs Grant Gender-Based Asylum Claim, OPINIONS/ANALYSIS ON IM-
MIGR. L. (Jan. 20, 2019), https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2019/1/20/ijs-grant-gender-based-
asylum-claims [https://perma.cc/3EB8-6V3S] (noting that, although some immigration judges have 
accepted gender-based asylum claims, no appeal involving such a claim has been decided in a federal 
circuit court since Matter of A-B-, and the BIA has remained silent on the issue of whether gender-
based claims remain viable). 
 200 See generally GUIDANCE AFTER MATTER OF A-B-, supra note 197. 
 201 Id. at 6; see also Dara Lind, Jeff Sessions Is Pushing Asylum Officers to Reject More Migrants. 
Will They Go Along?, VOX (July 20, 2018), https://www.vox.com/2018/7/20/17568480/border-asylum-
sessions-credible-fear [https://perma.cc/8A6R-BF5G] (indicating that certain claims would generally 
be denied). 
 202 344 F. Supp. 3d 96, 104–05, 119 (D.D.C. 2018), appeal filed sub nom. Grace v. Barr, No. 19-
5013 (D.C. Cir. filed Jan. 30, 2019). Only the United States District Court for the District of Columbia 
has jurisdiction to review whether certain immigration procedures or policy directives are impermissi-
ble. INA § 242(e)(3)(A) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1152(e)(3)(A)). 
 203 See Grace, 344 F. Supp. 3d at 126–27 (determining that although the term “particular social 
group” is ambiguous and subject to the Chevron framework, the general rule created by Matter of A-
B- and the USCIS guidelines is not a reasonable interpretation of the statute). 
 204 See id. at 128 (finding that the standard set by Matter of A-B- and the USCIS guidelines that a 
government condone or be completely helpless to stop a non-state actor is inconsistent with the stand-
ard set for the term “persecution” in the INA). 
 205 See id. (determining that Congress adopted the “unable or unwilling” standard in the Refugee 
Act of 1980 and thus AG Sessions’ condoned or completely helpless standard is an impermissible 
reinterpretation of the persecution requirement). 
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therefore contradictory court precedent could not be ignored.206 The District 
Court decision applies to asylum officers who conduct credible fear interviews, 
but it is unclear whether the decision will be used persuasively by immigration 
judges and the BIA going forward.207 At present, Grace dictates that asylum 
claims based on domestic violence cannot be barred at the credible fear stage, 
but might not prevent many claims based on domestic violence from failing 
later on in the asylum adjudication process.208 
III. SESSIONS ISN’T JUST WRONG, HE’S UNREASONABLE: WHY MATTER OF 
A-B- SHOULD NOT BE AFFORDED CHEVRON DEFERENCE 
It must be seriously considered whether AG Sessions’ controversial deci-
sion in Matter of A-B- represents a legitimate exercise of agency decision-
making power under Chevron.209 Section A of this Part asserts that the height-
ened standard for persecution established by Matter of A-B- should not be ana-
lyzed under the Chevron framework.210 Section B argues that, on the basis of 
either arbitrary and capricious review under the APA or Step Two of Chevron, 
federal courts should not follow the precedent set by AG Sessions in Matter of 
A-B-.211 Section C contends that in light of the concerns raised by Matter of A-
B- about agency decision making, the Supreme Court should clarify the 
boundaries of Chevron and Brand X.212 
                                                                                                                           
 206 See id. at 137–38 (holding that the USCIS guidelines could not direct asylum officers to ignore 
circuit court precedent based on Brand X because the ruling only applies where there is a finding that 
agency deference is appropriate). The issue that the court in Grace had with the agency’s interpreta-
tion of Brand X in the USCIS guidelines was its scope. Id. at 137. The USCIS guidelines did not 
simply direct agency employees to ignore circuit court precedent on the definition of particular social 
group, the interpretation of which the agency was clearly owed deference under Chevron. Id. The 
directive went further, asking asylum officers to ignore any past or future federal court decision that 
did not comport with any part of Matter of A-B-. Id. The court in Grace rejected the government’s 
argument that it could use Brand X to ignore any court decisions that conflicted with the “sweeping 
proclamations” made in Matter of A-B-. Id. According to the court, this kind of directive could only be 
legitimate if every aspect of Matter of A-B- was both entitled to deference and reasonable under Chev-
ron Step Two. Id. at 138. 
 207 Jeffrey S. Chase, How Far Reaching Is the Impact of Grace v. Whitaker?, OPINIONS/
ANALYSIS ON IMMIGR. L. (Dec. 24, 2018), https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2018/12/24/how-far-
reaching-is-the-impact-of-grace-v-whitaker [https://perma.cc/ZHR2-HY2N]. 
 208 Id. 
 209 See infra notes 213–269 and accompanying text. 
 210 See infra notes 213–230 and accompanying text. 
 211 See infra notes 231–250 and accompanying text. 
 212 See infra notes 251–269 and accompanying text. 
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A. Step One: Circuit Courts Should Not Defer to the Heightened Standard 
for Persecution Imposed in Matter of A-B- at Chevron Step One 
Matter of A-B- represents a reversal of the previous agency position re-
garding asylum claims based on PSGs that involve domestic violence.213 For 
the most part, circuit courts have determined that Congress did not provide a 
definition of PSG in the Immigration and Nationality Act or in earlier immi-
gration statutes, and therefore reasonable agency interpretations of the term 
should be afforded deference under Chevron.214 Yet this is only one part of the 
Matter of A-B- decision; Sessions also opines on other elements of an asylum 
claim.215 One of those elements is the standard for persecution by a non-state 
actor, which AG Sessions attempted to heighten.216 Based in part on the analy-
sis from Grace v. Whitaker that the AG’s interpretation of the definition of per-
secution was unlawful, this precedent should not be applied by federal courts 
when they review claims involving non-state actors.217 
Although Grace instructs asylum officers who conduct credible fear in-
terviews not to apply the unlawful aspects of Matter of A-B- and accompany-
ing USCIS guidelines, no such bar exists for immigration court judges, the 
BIA, or the federal circuit courts.218 Notwithstanding Grace, AG Sessions ar-
gues that his findings in Matter of A-B- are acceptable because he has the au-
                                                                                                                           
 213 See supra notes 180–192 and accompanying text (describing the outcome of Matter of A-B- 
and its impact on domestic violence-related asylum claims); 27 I. & N. 316 (A.G. 2018). 
 214 See, e.g., Orellana-Monson v. Holder, 685 F.3d 511, 520–21 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding that the 
BIA’s “particularity” and “social visibility” requirements for a cognizable PSG are entitled to defer-
ence under Chevron); Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Attorney Gen., 663 F.3d 582, 590 (3d Cir. 2010) (de-
termining that the BIA’s interpretation of the requirements of a PSG should be analyzed under the 
Chevron doctrine); Lwin v. INS, 144 F.3d 505, 511–12 (7th Cir. 1998) (affording Chevron deference 
to the BIA’s construction of PSG in Matter of Acosta); see also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). It should be noted, however, that there is a strong argu-
ment that when Congress included the term “particular social group” in legislation, they intended to 
tether the meaning of the term to international refugee treaties rather than allow the term to be inter-
preted independently. Bassina Farbenblum, Executive Deference in U.S. Refugee Law: Internationalist 
Paths Through and Beyond Chevron, 60 DUKE L.J. 1059, 1078 (2011). 
 215 See 27 I. & N. at 337–39 (determining that the applicant satisfied neither the requirement that 
the government be “unable or unwilling” to control the persecution nor the requirement that the perse-
cution be “on account of” membership in a PSG). 
 216 Id. at 318. 
 217 See 344 F. Supp. 3d 96, 115 (D.D.C. 2018) (determining that Matter of A-B- could not be 
construed to bar domestic violence-based asylum claims at the credible fear stage), appeal filed sub 
nom. Grace v. Barr, No. 19-5013 (D.C. Cir. filed Jan. 30, 2019). 
 218 See id. (describing the limited jurisdiction of the District Court under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(3)(A) 
to review negative credible fear determinations where the challenge concerns a question of legality of 
a written policy or guideline issued under the authority of the AG that pertains to the expedited re-
moval of immigrants); see also supra note 206 and accompanying text (explaining the limits on how 
USCIS could use Brand X to direct asylum officers to ignore past or future circuit court precedent that 
conflicted with Matter of A-B-). 
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thority to reverse previous precedent under Brand X.219 But the definition of 
persecution is not ambiguous; the “condoned or complete helplessness” stand-
ard for persecution by non-state actors suggested by AG Sessions should not 
be afforded deference under Brand X because it should not be afforded defer-
ence under Chevron.220 
Chevron deference is inapplicable because the “unable or unwilling to 
protect” standard in the definition of “persecution” is so entrenched in con-
gressional intent and BIA precedent that the term is not ambiguous.221 An 
agency’s statutory interpretation fails Step One of Chevron when there is no 
statutory ambiguity at issue.222 Although Sessions does claim to apply the “un-
able or unwilling” to protect standard, the standard he is imposing is in prac-
tice heightened.223 Using a standard where a government must condone or be 
completely helpless to prevent persecution would require circuit courts to 
overturn previous cases that AG Sessions does not purport to touch.224 AG Ses-
                                                                                                                           
 219 Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 327; see Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Inter-
net Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005) (holding that previous federal court precedent does not foreclose 
agencies from implementing a different reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute). 
 220 See Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2113 (2018) (stating that where Congress provides 
unambiguous guidance, Chevron analysis is not necessary or appropriate); Brand X, 545 U.S. at 981 
(noting that a change of policy is only legitimate if the statute is ambiguous and the agency provides a 
reasoned explanation for the reversal). 
 221 Grace, 344 F. Supp. 3d at 128. In Matter of Acosta, the BIA determined that Congress intend-
ed to impose a standard that the harm inflicted on an asylum applicant be either inflicted by the gov-
ernment or be of the type that the government was “unable or unwilling” to control. 19 I. & N. Dec. 
211, 222–23 (B.I.A. 1985). The BIA came to this conclusion because the persecution language in the 
INA is identical to that which was used in statutes in existence prior to the Refugee Act of 1980. Id. 
Applying rules of statutory interpretation, the BIA then reasoned that where Congress continues to use 
a term from a previous statute, it carries forward the established meaning of that term. Id. at 223. In 
addition, it is important to note that one of the established exceptions to the application of Brand X is 
where precedent is so well established that it effectively renders the statute unambiguous and therefore 
no longer eligible for Chevron deference. Craig, supra note 47, at 19. 
 222 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43. 
 223 Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 320. AG Sessions dictates that an applicant must show that 
private violence was “condoned” by the government or that the government “demonstrated a complete 
helplessness” to protect the victim. Id. at 337; see Grace, 344 F. Supp. 3d at 130 (determining that the 
“condoned or complete helplessness” standard referenced by AG Sessions in Matter of A-B- was im-
permissible because the correct standard is “unwilling or unable to control”) (internal quotations omit-
ted). 
 224 See Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 337, 343 (determining that although the police were 
unable to stop the abuse that respondent A-B- endured with restraining orders or arrests, she did not 
meet the “unable or unwilling” to protect standard). For example, there are a number of cases wherein 
the BIA determined that even where the respondent did not seek assistance from the police, they es-
tablished that the government was “unable or unwilling” to control the non-state actor that perpetrated 
the harm because the government would not have helped even if the respondent reported it. See, e.g., 
In re S-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1328, 1335 (B.I.A 2000) (determining that although the respondent did not 
request assistance from the government, she established past persecution by showing that the govern-
ment of Morocco was not in a position to assist her). In contrast, the respondent in Matter of A-B- not 
only provided country conditions describing the inability and unwillingness of the Salvadoran gov-
ernment to protect her against domestic violence, but also demonstrated that she sought assistance and 
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sions goes on to dictate that neither the failure to act on a report nor the inef-
fectiveness of police response to reports of domestic violence are sufficient to 
meet such a standard, casting considerable doubt on whether any factual cir-
cumstances would satisfy the standard after Matter of A-B-.225 If the standard 
set in Matter of A-B- cannot be satisfied, then AG Sessions effectively created 
a general rule against domestic violence claims, which is an unreasonable in-
terpretation of the statute and fails Chevron Step Two.226 
Moreover, to use Brand X to force the adoption of this heightened stand-
ard would be an offense to separation of powers of the type described by then-
Judge Gorsuch in his concurrence in Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch.227 Judge 
Gorsuch also raised the concern that the broad application of Brand X would 
allow political appointees to alter existing laws without advanced notice to the 
parties impacted.228 By altering the well-established, unambiguous definition 
of persecution as harm that the government is “unable or unwilling” to control, 
AG Sessions does just that.229 At the very least, federal courts reviewing Mat-
ter of A-B- or attempting to apply it in the future should construe as dicta the 
language that AG Sessions uses to heighten the standard for persecution by a 
non-state actor and decline to apply it.230 
B. Step Two: Even if Courts Defer at Chevron Step One, AG  
Sessions Fails Arbitrary and Capricious Review 
Even if a reviewing court were to allow the Chevron analysis to proceed 
past Step One, AG Sessions’ decision with regard to persecution by a non-state 
actor fails Step Two.231 There is no consensus as to the appropriate approach to 
                                                                                                                           
that it was ineffective. 27 I. & N. Dec. at 343–44. AG Sessions held this was insufficient to establish 
persecution. Id. 
 225 See Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 337, 343 (finding that the government’s lack of assis-
tance, even after reports to law enforcement, was insufficient to establish that they were unable or 
unwilling to protect the respondent). 
 226 See Craig, supra note 47 (noting that if Congress’s intent is unambiguously expressed, the 
agency must give effect to the statutory language); see also Grace, 344 F. Supp. 3d at 126–27 (deter-
mining that even where the agency is owed deference, a general rule against certain claims created by 
the USCIS Guidelines is not a reasonable interpretation of the statute and thus fails Chevron Step 
Two). 
 227 See 834 F.3d 1142, 1149–50 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (arguing that Brand X 
requires the neutral judiciary to yield its authority to a politically motivated arm of government, which 
inherently blurs the lines between the distinct branches of government). 
 228 Id. at 1149. 
 229 See supra note 225 and accompanying text (describing the types of evidence that are insuffi-
cient to meet the heightened standard imposed by Sessions in A-B-, which includes information previ-
ously found to meet the requirements); Grace, 344 F. Supp. 3d at 130 (determining that AG Sessions 
impermissibly applied a “condoned or complete helplessness” standard) (internal quotations omitted). 
 230 NAT’L IMMIGRATION JUSTICE CTR., supra note 19, at 1. 
 231 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–44 (describing the two questions a court must consider when 
determining whether the way that an agency construed a statute is permissible); see also Matter of A-
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analysis of agency decision making at Chevron Step Two, and further, whether 
there is any practical distinction between Step Two review and APA arbitrary 
and capricious review.232 Nonetheless, recent Court precedent suggests a trend 
towards analysis at Chevron Step Two with an approach akin to arbitrary and 
capricious review.233 In light of the likelihood that courts reviewing Matter of 
A-B- will undertake analysis resembling arbitrary and capricious review at 
Chevron Step Two, there are several components of the decision that bely its 
unreasonableness.234 
One factor in the Court’s arbitrary and capricious jurisprudence is particu-
larly relevant here: the creation of a rule that will cause decisions to vary wild-
ly depending on the adjudicator.235 In Matter of A-B-, AG Sessions writes that 
the Salvadoran government’s failure to enforce the respondent’s restraining 
order did not establish that they were “unable or unwilling” to protect her.236 
AG Sessions also states that the fact that police did not respond to her emer-
gency call does not establish that the government was “unable or unwilling” to 
protect the respondent.237 These statements leave immigration advocates and 
immigration judges wondering what could ever constitute persecution by a 
non-state actor; although AG Sessions purports not to foreclose all asylum 
claims which involve violence by non-state actors, he fails to give any further 
guidance.238 It therefore follows that it is likely that adjudicators who endeavor 
                                                                                                                           
B-, 27 I. & N. at 343–44 (discussing whether the private criminal activity involved in the claim rose to 
the level of persecution by a non-state actor). 
 232 Barnett & Walker, supra note 50, at 1448, 1451. 
 233 Id. at 1454–57 (describing the reasoning in several Supreme Court cases wherein the court 
analyzed agency decisions under arbitrary and capricious review or a similar approach at Chevron 
Step Two); see, e.g., Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 52 n.7 (2011) (determining that the outcome 
would be the same under both Chevron Step Two and arbitrary and capricious review); see also Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act of 1946 (APA), Pub. L. No. 89-554, § 706(1)(A), 80 Stat. 378, 393 (1966) 
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C § 706(2)(a) (2018)) (dictating that a reviewing court should find that 
an agency decision is unlawful if it is determined to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 
otherwise in violation of the law). 
 234 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assoc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (deter-
mining that a court must consider whether an agency looked at all relevant factors in choosing a poli-
cy). 
 235 See Judulang, 565 U.S. at 55, 57–58, 62–63 (determining that an agency’s policy must be 
related to the purposes of the laws, cannot hinge wholly upon the discretion of a single agency offi-
cial, and cannot be justified because the agency failed to adequately distinguish its approach from the 
variety of approaches used by the agency previously). 
 236 See 27 I. & N. at 343–44 (determining that the BIA erred in finding that the Salvadoran gov-
ernment was “unable or unwilling” to protect the respondent). 
 237 Id. at 337–38. 
 238 See id. at 317 (noting that criminal activity by non-state actors meets the asylum requirements 
only under “exceptional circumstances”); see also MATTER OF A-B- CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 
193, at 4 (noting that AG Sessions attempted to heighten the “unable or unwilling” to control standard 
and indicating that the assertion that government inaction was insufficient to meet the standard lacked 
clarity); NAT’L IMMIGRATION JUSTICE CTR., supra note 19, at 24 (emphasizing the importance of 
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to adhere to Matter of A-B- will essentially have to make their best guess about 
what meets the “unable or unwilling” standard.239 This determination will like-
ly vary amongst adjudicators even where similar facts are involved.240 Because 
of this lack of clarity as to what can constitute persecution by a non-state actor, 
decisions will turn upon the views of individual adjudicators as to what meets 
the standard, rather than any reasoned approach to review.241 This, according to 
Judulang, belies a decision that is likely arbitrary and capricious.242 
Another factor in the Court’s arbitrary and capricious jurisprudence is al-
so relevant here: the failure to distinguish past precedent or show reasoning if 
making a decision that contradicts past precedent.243 AG Sessions did not dis-
tinguish his decision in Matter of A-B- regarding the “unable or unwilling” 
standard with prior federal court and BIA decisions involving persecution by 
non-state actors, providing further support that the decision was arbitrary and 
capricious.244 First, AG Sessions ignores case law regarding the “unable” 
prong of the standard by asserting that the government’s willingness to protect 
the respondent by issuing multiple restraining orders and having her abuser 
arrested meant that she did not suffer persecution.245 Multiple federal circuit 
courts found that the failure of police to prevent further violence indicates their 
inability to protect the victim, and AG Sessions failed to reconcile his decision 
with this precedent.246 AG Sessions also states that the persistence of domestic 
                                                                                                                           
asserting that AG Sessions did not actually change the “unable or unwilling” standard for persecution 
and anticipating that adjudicators will look much more closely at this element in the future). 
 239 Supra note 238 and accompanying text (noting the lack of clarity in how to prove persecution 
by a non-state actor after A-B-). 
 240 See Judulang, 565 U.S. at 57 (determining that the BIA decision failed the arbitrary and capri-
cious test because, in part, the eligibility for relief turned upon the decision of an individual adjudica-
tor, which could result in different outcomes in cases with similar facts). 
 241 See id. at 58 (finding that a policy that hinges on an individual’s subjective assessment is arbi-
trary and capricious). 
 242 See id. at 59–60 (stating that deportation decisions should not be a “sport of chance”). 
 243 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 534–35 (2007) (finding that the action is arbitrary 
and capricious, where there is a statutory obligation to respond, if the agency did not provide a suffi-
ciently reasoned explanation for its refusal to respond). 
 244 See, e.g., Gathungu v. Holder, 725 F.3d 900, 908–09 (8th Cir. 2013) (finding that evidence 
that the police did not take sufficient action to combat gang violence or were complicit in such vio-
lence established that the government was “unable or unwilling” to control it). Even in In re R-A-, 
despite its similarities to Matter of A-B-, the BIA recognized that the domestic violence suffered by 
the respondent constitutes persecution because she could not get any protection from the government. 
In re R-A, 22 I. & N. 906, 914 (B.I.A. 2001). 
 245 See Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. at 343 (describing the actions that the respondent and the police 
took to try to prevent the abuse from continuing); BLAINE BOOKEY ET AL., CTR FOR GENDER & REF-
UGEE STUDIES, MATTER OF A-B- PRACTICE ADVISORY 25 (July 6, 2018), https://uchastings.app.box.
com/s/57k2hk6rpyjh7bbmebld4195r2wsdzt0/file/302956088950 [https://perma.cc/X843-RR6D] (ar-
guing that AG Sessions failed to consider both the unable and unwilling elements of the standard). 
 246 See, e.g., Afriyie v. Holder, 613 F.3d 924, 931 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that the ability to file a 
police report speaks to whether the government is willing to protect an asylee, not whether they are 
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violence in El Salvador does not help to establish that the respondent met the 
“unable or unwilling” standard, despite precedent that the prevalence of such 
violence in a country is relevant to the determination.247 AG Sessions claims to 
adhere to the “unable or unwilling” standard and does not purport to overturn 
any existing precedent involving non-state actors, but he does not make any 
attempt to distinguish Matter of A-B- from cases adverse to it.248 
Based upon the guidance from Judulang, Sessions’ approach to the “una-
ble or unwilling” standard for persecution by a non-state actor likely fails arbi-
trary and capricious review based on these two factors.249 If a decision based 
on a statute is unreasonable or arbitrary and capricious, it cannot reflect the 
intent of Congress and therefore fails Chevron Step Two.250 
C. Step Three?: In Light of the Concerns Raised by Matter of A-B-, the 
Supreme Court Should Clarify Chevron and Brand X Precedents 
The Supreme Court’s Chevron jurisprudence often creates more confu-
sion than clarity, particularly with regard to the opposing ideological positions 
presented in Mead and Brand X.251 Both Chevron and Brand X call upon courts 
to defer to agency decision making, based upon a belief that agencies are better 
equipped than courts to make specialized, technical determinations about the 
meaning of ambiguous statutory language.252 In theory, this is beneficial to 
political accountability, cohesive statutory interpretation, and judicial efficien-
cy.253 Although Brand X states that the mere fact that an interpretation contra-
dicts the agency’s previous stance does not make the new interpretation unrea-
                                                                                                                           
able to); Guchshenkov v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 554, 944 (7th Cir. 2004) (finding that failure of police to 
respond after a report was filed and the violence continued was significant). 
 247 See Valdiviezo-Galdamez, 502 F.3d at 289 n.2 (noting that the prevalence of gang violence 
actually supports the conclusion that the government was unable to protect the respondent). 
 248 27 I. & N. at 325–26 (citing the “unable or unwilling” to protect standard). 
 249 See supra note 235 and accompanying text (describing factors that should be considered under 
arbitrary and capricious review); see also 565 U.S. at 62–63 (determining that the agency view was 
arbitrary and capricious because it was not supported by consistent practice). 
 250 Judulang, 565 U.S. at 52 n.7. 
 251 See Beermann, supra note 32, at 732, 740–43 (outlining the problems with the Chevron doc-
trine under the Roberts court, including the applicability of Brand X and the unclear boundaries of 
Chevron’s domain). 
 252 See Brand X, 545 U.S. at 1002–03 (resolving that because the agency was dealing with tech-
nical, specialized subject matter, it was in a better position to resolve a statutory ambiguity than the 
Court); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 864 (describing the area in which the EPA was dictating policy as tech-
nical and complex). 
 253 Nicholas R. Bednar & Barbara Marchevsky, Deferring to the Rule of Law: A Comparative 
Look at United States Deference Doctrines, 47 U. MEM. L. REV. 1047, 1053–54 (2017). Deference 
addresses the goal of political accountability by vesting statutory interpretation in the hands of admin-
istrative agencies led by political appointees rather than life-tenured federal judges who do not ulti-
mately answer to voters. Id. Deference promotes cohesiveness by seeking to ensure that all federal 
courts interpret a statute the same way, as dictated by the administrative agency. Id. at 1054. 
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sonable, this concept should not be stretched to allow for complete policy re-
versals each time a different political party assumes the presidency.254 When 
agencies are allowed to act based on political motivations rather than providing 
an adequately reasoned justification for their policy choice, they diminish the 
role of Congress and the judiciary.255 
Even before Matter of A-B-, it was clear that federal courts did not always 
feel compelled to uphold immigration agency decisions despite the high level 
of deference courts are instructed to give agencies.256 The Third and Seventh 
Circuits’ refusals to adopt the BIA’s “particularity” and “social distinction” 
requirements for PSGs are indicative of this history.257 Even where courts de-
termined that their decisions must give way under Brand X, they sometimes 
questioned whether the doctrine should be reconsidered, as then-Judge Gor-
such did in his concurrence in Gutierrez-Brizuela.258 Specifically, he noted that 
the current framework might allow politically motivated decisionmakers to 
designate disfavored groups for maltreatment, which is arguably what AG Ses-
sions did in Matter of A-B-.259 
                                                                                                                           
 254 See Brand X, 545 U.S. at 980 (determining that stare decisis should not prevent a federal court 
from analyzing a new agency interpretation under Chevron); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Chevron’s Mis-
take, 58 DUKE L.J. 546, 556 (2009) (cautioning against complete abandonment of the role of the judi-
ciary and suggesting some possible limitations on Chevron); e.g., Greenberg, supra note 68, at 579–80 
(describing the gag rule put in place by the George H.W. Bush administration, rescinded by the Clin-
ton administration, and reinstituted by the George W. Bush administration). 
 255 See Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1152 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (raising a concern that 
Brand X allows courts to abandon their constitutional responsibilities); Bressman, supra note 254 
(calling upon courts to make certain that agency choices remain within the powers granted to them by 
Congress). 
 256 See, e.g., Judulang, 565 U.S. at 52–54 (considering a BIA policy under APA arbitrary and 
capricious review and determining that the agency should not be granted discretion); Valdiviezo-
Galdamez, 663 F.3d at 608 (determining that because BIA decisions on the social visibility and par-
ticularity elements of a PSG were not consistent, Chevron deference was not appropriate); Gatimi v. 
Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615–16 (7th Cir. 2009) (noting that the BIA precedent on the social visibility 
requirement was inconsistent and determining that, based on this inconsistency, they were not com-
pelled to pick one inconsistent interpretation to defer to). 
 257 Valdiviezo-Galdamez, 663 F.3d at 608; Gatimi, 578 F.3d at 615–16. 
 258 See, e.g., Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1149–58 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (raising questions 
as to the constitutional legitimacy of Brand X). Although Gorsuch determined that the Tenth Circuit 
was compelled by Brand X to defer to the BIA, and in fact wrote the majority opinion in the case, he 
also wrote separately to send a strong message regarding the separation of powers, fair notice, and 
equal protection concerns that he had about Brand X. Id. at 1149. 
 259 See id. at 1149–50 (asserting that the founders employed separation of powers to avoid the very 
dangers that Brand X allows for); supra notes 171–179 and accompanying text (describing AG Sessions’ 
extensive history of animosity towards women and immigrants during his decades-long political career). 
The reasoning employed in Matter of A-B- particularly disfavors such women because the primary rea-
sons that men and women are displaced and seek asylum are often different. See Ariadna Estevez, Sexual 
and Domestic Violence: The Hidden Reasons Why Mexican Women Flee Their Homes, THE CONVER-
SATION (Sept. 27, 2017), https://theconversation.com/sexual-and-domestic-violence-the-hidden-
reasons-why-mexican-women-flee-their-homes-65352 [https://perma.cc/5KEG-5GF7] (indicating 
research that Mexican men are displaced for reasons of criminal and state violence, such as extortion, 
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Although there is a role for agencies to play in the interpretation of stat-
utes and in policy making, the Supreme Court should clarify and narrow the 
degree of deference afforded to agencies under Chevron Step Two and Brand 
X.260 Because the Court has in effect created a spectrum of deference according 
to subject matter, the Court should clarify what deference is appropriate and 
when it is appropriate.261 For example, it may be appropriate to be extremely 
deferential to the technical determinations of EPA scientists regarding toxic 
pollutant limitations under the Clean Water Act, but not in determining the evi-
dence needed to show persecution in an asylum case.262 In fact, many of the 
leading cases that establish the formula for Chevron deference involve tech-
nical or scientific subject matter; the Court may not have considered how 
Chevron should apply to more accessible subject matter when it was develop-
ing the doctrine.263 
In the future, the Court should also seriously consider whether a broad 
reading of Chevron and Brand X creates separation of powers crisis.264 The 
                                                                                                                           
while rape, gender-based violence, and sex trafficking are the primary motivators for Mexican women 
to seek asylum). Immigration advocates argue that AG Sessions’ labeling of domestic violence as 
“private violence” fails to acknowledge that these claims are part of a bigger trend of government 
attitudes towards gender-based violence in many Latin American countries. Jack Herrera, In Asylum 
Claims, Is Domestic Abuse ‘Private Violence’ or a Societal Issue?, PAC. STANDARD (Nov. 19, 2018), 
https://psmag.com/news/in-asylum-claims-is-domestic-abuse-private-violence-or-a-societal-issue 
[https://perma.cc/PRN6-QGCW]. 
 260 See Barnett & Walker, supra note 50, at 1142–45 (describing the evolving nature of the Chev-
ron doctrine, how additional considerations were added over time, and the lack of clarity that remains 
with regards to the correct application). In fifty-one cases where an agency faced a Step Two analysis 
of its chosen policy, courts applied several different approaches, and in 28% of cases the approach did 
not conform with any recognized Step Two analysis. Id. at 1445. Part of the problem is that most of 
the scholarship surrounding Chevron is focused on Step Zero or Step One. See id. at 1143–44. 
 261 See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 56, at 1144; see also supra notes 74–77 and accompanying 
text (describing the spectrum of deference afforded to agencies based on subject matter). 
 262 Compare INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 447–49 (1987) (determining that although 
the term “well-founded fear” is ambiguous, the BIA’s interpretation that it required an asylum appli-
cant to prove a clear probability of future persecution was unreasonable and therefore not entitled to 
Chevron deference), with Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116, 134 
(1985) (finding that the EPA’s interpretation of limitations on toxic pollutants under the Clean Water 
Act was reasonable based on the statute and therefore should be afforded deference under Chevron). 
 263 See Brand X, 545 U.S. at 974 (considering whether the FCC’s determination that broadband 
internet service sold by cable companies was not a telecommunications service under the Communica-
tions Act of 1934); Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n, 470 U.S. at 132–33 (considering whether the EPA was reason-
able in its development of a “fundamentally different factor” test to determine whether a variance may 
be granted with regard to the limitations to toxic pollutants established by the Clean Water Act); 
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 839–40 (considering whether the EPA’s definition of “stationary source” was 
reasonable in relation to regulations under which the agency could impose requirements on states that 
had not achieved national air-quality standards under the Clean Air Act). 
 264 See Jill E. Family, Immigration Law Allies and Administrative Law Adversaries, 32 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 99, 100–02 (2018) (describing the separation of powers concerns that immigration advo-
cates and administrative law opponents share). Immigration law particularly exemplifies these con-
cerns in two respects. Id. at 100–01. First, the plenary power doctrine grants the political branches 
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Court appears to have exempted itself from Brand X by refusing to give way 
when its own precedent runs up against an agency directive.265 This indicates 
that the Court is not willing to completely abandon its constitutionally pre-
scribed role to determine what the law is.266 It is necessary for the Court to 
limit Chevron and Brand X to preserve that role for lower federal courts as 
well.267 By clarifying what the Chevron analysis should look like at Step Two 
through definitively adopting the arbitrary and capricious standard, the Court 
can, at least in part, address this problem.268 By narrowing the application of 
Brand X and allowing federal circuit courts to make more reasoned decisions 
where their own precedents contradict agency interpretations, the Court can 
support the stated goals of Chevron: efficiency, predictability, and the use of 
agency expertise to best satisfy the legislative intent of Congress.269 
CONCLUSION 
Underlying asylum law in the United States is an international commit-
ment to provide protection for individuals persecuted on account of their 
membership in a protected group. AG Sessions’ decision in Matter of A-B- 
stands in violation of this commitment. His decision to refer Matter of A-B- to 
himself, as well as his failure to issue a decision consistent with past precedent, 
indicates that his intent was to prevent virtually all asylum claims based on 
domestic violence rather than adhere to the law. Though this decision was par-
ticularly egregious, it was preceded by a decades-long history of unpredictabil-
ity and inconsistency with regard to asylum claims that involve violence 
against women. Despite the policy arguments and trends in domestic law that 
favor protecting women who are abused, agency decisions in the immigration 
                                                                                                                           
broad powers over immigration policy. Id. Second, in legislating immigration policy, Congress lim-
ited judicial review. Id. 
 265 See United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 566 U.S. 478, 486–87 (2012) (determin-
ing that Brand X did not apply to a new agency interpretation of a statute previously considered by the 
Court, even though it had, in its previous opinion, described the statutory provision at hand as not 
unambiguous); see also Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, 557 U.S. 519, 548–49 (2009) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (noting that the Court’s refusal to find that the agency construction trumps the Court’s 
prior judicial construction is inconsistent with Brand X). 
 266 See Home Concrete, 566 U.S. at 486–87 (2012). In fact, in his concurrence in Brand X, Justice 
Stevens noted that the directive that agencies could adopt a contrary interpretation to federal appellate 
precedent would not necessarily apply to the Court itself. 545 U.S. at 1003 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 267 See Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1152 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (characterizing Brand X as 
a judge-created abandonment of judicial responsibility). 
 268 Supra notes 231–249 and accompanying text (applying an APA arbitrary and capricious ap-
proach at Step Two when analyzing AG Sessions’ decision in Matter of A-B-); see Barnett & Walker, 
supra note 50, at 1454–57 (describing the similarities between Step Two and arbitrary and capricious 
review, and referencing cases where courts engaged in something akin to arbitrary and capricious 
review at Step Two). 
 269 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44 (identifying the Court’s policy rationales for its holding); see 
supra notes 96–99 and accompanying text (describing the policy justifications underlying Chevron). 
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space have not followed suit. The DOJ’s inability to “pick a side” when it 
comes to these claims creates confusion for federal courts, which feel com-
pelled to obey agency directives under Chevron and Brand X over their own 
interpretation of the law. These concerns should lead the Supreme Court to 
question whether it should take another look at Chevron jurisprudence in order 
to provide more guidance for both agencies and courts. Ultimately, whatever 
path agencies and courts take has a direct impact on the lives of women like 
Rosa, who remain in a position of particular vulnerability because of the lack 
of protection they would otherwise receive under asylum law. 
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